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Abstract
We consider the basic bidirectional relaying problem, in which two users in a wireless network wish
to exchange messages through an intermediate relay node. In the compute-and-forward strategy, the relay
computes a function of the two messages using the naturally-occurring sum of symbols simultaneously
transmitted by user nodes in a Gaussian multiple access (MAC) channel, and the computed function value
is forwarded to the user nodes in an ensuing broadcast phase. In this paper, we study the problem under
an additional security constraint, which requires that each user’s message be kept secure from the relay. We
consider two types of security constraints: perfect secrecy, in which the MAC channel output seen by the
relay is independent of each user’s message; and strong secrecy, which is a form of asymptotic independence.
We propose a coding scheme based on nested lattices, the main feature of which is that given a pair of
nested lattices that satisfy certain “goodness” properties, we can explicitly specify probability distributions
for randomization at the encoders to achieve the desired security criteria. In particular, our coding scheme
guarantees perfect or strong secrecy even in the absence of channel noise. The noise in the channel only
affects reliability of computation at the relay, and for Gaussian noise, we derive achievable rates for reliable
and secure computation. We also present an application of our methods to the multi-hop line network in
which a source needs to transmit messages to a destination through a series of intermediate relays.
I. Introduction
Consider a network having three nodes, denoted by A, B and R, as shown in Fig. I. The nodes A and B,
henceforth called the user nodes, wish to exchange information with each other. However, they are connected
only to R, and not to each other directly. The node R acts as a bidirectional relay between A and B, and
facilitates communication between them. All nodes are assumed to operate in half-duplex mode (they cannot
transmit and receive simultaneously), and all links between nodes are wireless (unit channel gain) additive
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2white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. Bidirectional relaying in such settings has been studied extensively
in the recent literature [2], [25], [29], [36], [39].
We use the compute-and-forward framework proposed in [25], [36] for bidirectional relaying, and we
briefly describe a binary version for completeness and clarity. Suppose that A and B possess bits X and
Y , respectively. We will assume that X and Y are generated independently and uniformly at random. The
goal in bidirectional relaying is to transmit X to B and Y to A through R. To achieve this goal, a compute-
and-forward protocol takes place in two phases as shown in Fig. 2: (1) the (Gaussian) multiple access phase
or the MAC phase, where the user nodes simultaneously transmit to the relay, and (2) the broadcast phase,
where the relay transmits to the user nodes. In the MAC phase, the user nodes A and B independently
modulate their bits X and Y into real-valued symbols U and V , respectively. The relay receives an instance
of a random variable W , that can be modeled as
W = U + V + Z, (1)
where it is assumed that the links A→ R and B→ R have unit gain, Z denotes additive white Gaussian noise
independent of U and V , and communication is assumed to be synchronized. Using W , the relay computes
the XOR of the two message bits, i.e., X ⊕ Y , and in the broadcast phase, encodes it into a real symbol
which is transmitted to the two users over a broadcast channel. Note that A and B can recover Y and X,
respectively, from X ⊕ Y .
A R B
Fig. 1. Bidirectional relay.
In the compute-and-forward bidirectional relaying problem described above, we study the scenario where
an additional secrecy constraint is imposed on the relay R. Specifically, we require that, in the MAC phase,
the relay remain ignorant of the individual bits X and Y , while still being able to compute the XOR
X⊕Y reliably. The relay is assumed to be “honest-but-curious”: it behaves like a passive eavesdropper, but
otherwise helps in the exchange of messages. We study the problem under two secrecy constraints: perfect
secrecy, which we describe next, and strong secrecy, which we describe further below. Perfect secrecy refers
to the requirement that the relay be fully ignorant of the individual bits, i.e., that the random variables
U+V , X, and Y be pairwise independent. More generally, the user nodes encode the messages X and Y into
d-dimensional real vectors U and V respectively, and we require U + V to be statistically independent of
each individual message. The problem of secure bidirectional relaying in the presence of an untrusted relay
under a perfect secrecy constraint has not been studied prior to this work, and this is a major contribution
of this paper.
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Fig. 2. Bidirectional relaying: (a) MAC phase, (b) Broadcast phase.
We propose a coding scheme for secure bidirectional relaying that uses a pair of nested lattices (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ),
with Λ(d)0 ⊂ Λ(d). In our scheme, the messages are mapped to the cosets of the coarse lattice Λ(d)0 in the fine
lattice Λ(d). Given a message (say, the jth coset, Λj) at the user node, the output of the encoder is a random
point chosen from that coset according to a distribution pj . This distribution is obtained by sampling and
normalizing over Λj , a well-chosen density function f on Rd. We will show that if the characteristic function
of f is supported within the fundamental Voronoi region of the Fourier dual of Λ(d)0 , then it is possible to
achieve perfect secrecy. We then study the average transmit power and achievable rates for reliable and
secure communication. We will show that a transmission rate of
[ 1
2 log2
P
σ2 − log2 2e
]+ is achievable with
perfect secrecy, where [x]+ denotes max{x, 0}. Our coding scheme for security is explicit, in that given any
pair of nested lattices, we precisely specify the distributions pj that must be used to obtain independence
between U + V and the individual messages.
We later relax the secrecy constraint, and only demand that the mutual information between U + V and
the individual messages be arbitrarily small for large block lengths, a requirement that is referred to as
strong secrecy [24]. We again use a nested-lattice coding scheme, but now the distributions pj are obtained
by sampling and normalizing a Gaussian function, instead of a density having a compactly supported
characteristic function. The idea of using probability mass functions (pmfs) obtained by sampling Gaussians
was used [22] in the context of the Gaussian wiretap channel, and we will make use of the techniques
developed there. Using this scheme, we show that a rate of
[ 1
2 log2
( 1
2 +
P
σ2
)− 12 log2 2e]+ is achievable.
We show that our schemes can achieve secrecy even in the absence of noise, and that the addition of
noise cannot leak any extra information to the relay. This allows us to develop the solution in two parts:
first, we give coding schemes based on nested lattices that achieve secrecy over a noiseless channel. Then,
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4we require the lattices to satisfy certain additional “goodness” properties in order to have reliable decoding
in the presence of noise. The signal (codeword) transmitted by each user acts as a jamming signal for the
other user’s message, and this helps achieve secrecy. In our scheme, the channel noise is not used to increase
confidentiality, unlike the Gaussian wiretap channel [22] where an increase in the noise variance on the
eavesdropper’s link can be used to achieve higher transmission rates. It may be possible to harness the
additive noise in the MAC phase to obtain higher achievable rates, but we do not pursue this in the present
work. However, our approach does offer an advantage: since our scheme guarantees secrecy in the absence of
noise, the security properties continue to hold even when channel noise is present, and this is true irrespective
of the noise distribution. Indeed, our scheme provides secrecy even if the channel noise follows an unknown
probability distribution, a property that is in general not satisfied by coding schemes for wiretap channels.
We only require the noise to be additive and independent of the transmitted codewords.
It is worth emphasizing the basic idea behind the construction of encoders in our coding schemes. Given
a pair of nested lattices, the user nodes send points from the fine lattice in the nested lattice pair according
to a pmf obtained by sampling a well-chosen density function at the fine lattice points. The choice of the
density function determines the level of security that is achievable.
In prior work, the problem of secure bidirectional relaying in the presence of an untrusted relay was studied
by He and Yener in [18], who showed that the mutual information rate, defined to be 1dI(X; U + V) =
1
dI(Y ; U + V) goes to zero for large blocklengths d. They later studied the problem under a strong secrecy
constraint in [19], and gave a scheme based on nested lattice codes and universal hash functions. Using
probabilistic arguments, they showed the existence of linear hash functions for randomization at the encoders
that achieve strong secrecy. In both scenarios, they showed that a rate of
[ 1
2 log2
( 1
2 +
P
σ2
)− 1]+ is achievable.
The achievable rates guaranteed by our strongly secure scheme is slightly lower than that obtained in [19].
However, our scheme avoids the use of hash functions, and given a pair of nested lattices that satisfy certain
“goodness” properties1, we give an explicit probability distribution for randomization at the encoders that
can be used to obtain strong secrecy.
The idea of using nested lattice codes for secure communication is not new. They have been proposed
for secure communication in other scenarios, particularly the Gaussian wiretap channel (see e.g., [4], [22],
[28]). They have also been used in interference networks [1], and for secret key generation using correlated
Gaussian sources [27].
Recall that the compute-and-forward protocol has two phases: a MAC phase and a broadcast phase. We
will restrict our study exclusively to the MAC phase, since there is no security requirement in the broadcast
phase and the relay can use a capacity-approaching code to broadcast X ⊕ Y to the users.
1Unfortunately, there are no known explicit constructions of lattices that satisfy these properties, but only existence results
based on probabilistic arguments.
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5Organization of the paper
We establish some basic notation and recall some definitions related to lattices in Section II. We describe
the secure bidirectional relaying problem in Section III, and then proceed to design coding schemes under
the perfect secrecy constraint in Section IV. The main result under the perfect secrecy constraint is given
in Theorem 1. We give a randomized encoding scheme for any arbitrary nested lattice code that achieves
perfect secrecy in the absence of noise in Section V, then study the effect of additive noise and find achievable
transmission rates in Section VI. Thereafter, we study the same problem under a strong secrecy constraint,
design coding schemes, and evaluate the performance in Section VII, with the main result summarized in
Theorem 16. In Section VIII, we show that these schemes can be extended to the multi-hop line network [18]
and find achievable transmission rates under the two secrecy constraints. We make some concluding remarks
in Section IX. Most of the technical proofs are given in appendices.
II. Definitions and Notation
We first describe the notation we will use throughout the paper. We denote the set of real numbers by R,
and integers by Z. We use the notation R+ for the set of nonnegative real numbers. The number of elements
in a finite set S is denoted by |S|. If x is a real number, then [x]+ is defined as max{x, 0}. Random vectors are
denoted in boldface upper case, e.g., U, and their instances in boldface lower case, as in u. The components
of the vectors are denoted in normal font, e.g., x = [x1 x2]T . Matrices are represented in sans-serif, as in H.
The Euclidean (`2) norm of a column vector h is denoted by ‖h‖. The identity matrix of size M ×M is
denoted by IM .
The probability of an event A is denoted by Pr[A]. If X is a random variable, then H(X) denotes the
entropy of X. The symbol E[·] denotes expectation. The characteristic function of a random variable X is
the function ψ(t) = E[eiXt], for t ∈ R. For random variables X,Y , the notation X ⊥ Y means that X and
Y are independent. The mutual information between X and Y is denoted by I(X;Y ).
Let f(n) and g(n) be sequences of positive real numbers. We say that g(n) = o(f(n)) if g(n)/f(n)→ 0 as
n → ∞. Also, g(n) = on(1) if g(n) → 0 as n → ∞. Furthermore, g(n) = Ω(f(n)) if there exists a constant
K > 0 such that g(n) > Kf(n) for all sufficiently large n, and g(n) = O(f(n)) if there exists a constant
K > 0 such that g(n) < Kf(n) for all sufficiently large n.
A. Lattices in Rd
We briefly recall some definitions of lattices and their properties. For a more detailed treatment, see
e.g., [3], [6].
Let k, d be positive integers with k ≤ d. Suppose u1,u2, . . . ,uk are linearly independent column vectors
in Rd. Then the set of all integer-linear combinations of the ui’s, Λ = {
∑k
i=1 aiui : ai ∈ Z, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, is
called a k-dimensional lattice in Rd. It is easy to verify that Λ forms an Abelian group under componentwise
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Fig. 3. Illustrating the QΛ(.) and the [.] mod Λ operation for the Z2 lattice.
addition. The collection of vectors {u1,u2, . . . ,uk} is called a basis for the lattice Λ; clearly, the basis of a
lattice is not unique, e.g., {−u1,−u2, . . . ,−uk} is also a basis.
The k × d matrix A := [u1 u2 · · · uk]T is called a generator matrix of Λ, and we say that the vectors
u1,u2, . . . ,uk generate Λ. We write Λ = ATZk := {ATx : x ∈ Zk}. If Λ is full-rank (i.e., Λ is a d-dimensional
lattice in Rd), then the determinant of Λ, denoted by detΛ is defined to be |det(A)|. It is a standard fact
that detΛ does not depend on the generator matrix. Unless mentioned otherwise, we will henceforth consider
full-rank lattices in Rd.
If Λ and Λ0 are two lattices in Rd such that Λ0 ⊂ Λ, then we say that Λ0 is a sublattice of Λ, or Λ0 is
nested within Λ. We call Λ0 the coarse lattice, and Λ, the fine lattice. The number of cosets of Λ0 in Λ is
called the index of Λ0 in Λ, denoted by |Λ/Λ0|. It is a standard fact that |Λ/Λ0| = detΛ0/detΛ [3, Theorem
5.2].
If A is a generator matrix of a lattice Λ, then Λ∗ := {(A−1)T z : z ∈ Zd} is called the dual lattice of Λ.
The dual lattice Λ∗ is also equal to {x : ∑di=1 xiyi ∈ Z for every y ∈ Λ}[3]. The Fourier dual of Λ, denoted
Λˆ, is defined as 2piΛ∗.
For any x ∈ Rd, we define the nearest neighbour quantizer QΛ(x) := arg minλ∈Λ‖x−λ‖ to be the function
which maps x to the closest point in Λ. The fundamental Voronoi region of Λ is defined as V(Λ) := {y :
QΛ(y) = 0}. The volume of the fundamental Voronoi region, vol(V(Λ)) is equal to detΛ [3], [6].
For any x ∈ Rd, we define the modulo-Λ operation as [x] mod Λ := x−QΛ(x). In other words, [x] mod Λ
gives the quantization error of the nearest neighbour quantizer QΛ(·). Figure 3 illustrates the QΛ(·) and the
modulo-Λ operations.
The covering radius of Λ, denoted by rcov(Λ), is defined as the radius of the smallest closed ball in Rd
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Fig. 4. Illustrating the covering, packing and effective radii of the hexagonal lattice.
centered at 0 which contains V(Λ). The effective radius, reff(Λ), is defined as the radius of a ball in Rd
having the same volume as that of V(Λ). The packing radius, rpack(Λ), is the radius of the largest open
ball centered at 0 which is contained in V(Λ). Clearly, rcov(Λ) ≥ reff(Λ) ≥ rpack(Λ). These parameters are
illustrated for the hexagonal lattice in Fig. 4.
The normalized second moment per dimension of Λ is defined as
GΛ = 1
d (detΛ)1+2/d
∫
V(Λ)
‖y‖2 dy. (2)
III. Description of the Problem
The general set-up is as follows: two user nodes, denoted by A and B, possess messages taking values
independently and uniformly in a finite set. For the purposes of computation at the relay, the messages are
mapped into random variables X and Y taking values in a finite Abelian group G(d), where the choice of G(d)
is left to the system designer. The mapping is such that the random variables X and Y remain uniformly
distributed over G(d), and we will see later that this distribution helps in achieving secrecy. The addition
operation in the group G(d) is denoted ⊕. The encoder at node A maps the given message X into a random
d-dimensional real vector U. In a similar fashion, the encoder at B maps the message Y to a random vector
V. The user nodes transmit their respective vectors to the relay simultaneously, and at the end of the MAC
phase, the relay obtains
W = U + V + Z, (3)
where Z is a Gaussian random vector with zero mean and covariance matrix σ2Id, where + denotes compo-
nentwise real addition. The coding scheme at each user node must ensure that the relay can recover X ⊕ Y
reliably from W, and one of the following:
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8• Perfect secrecy: The mutual information between W and each individual message is exactly zero2, i.e.,
I(W;X) = I(W;Y ) = 0.
• Strong secrecy: I(W;X) and I(W;Y ) can be made arbitrarily small for all sufficiently large d.
We in fact impose a slightly stronger security criterion than the one mentioned above. Even in the absence
of noise, the mutual information between W = U + V and each individual message must be either zero
(perfect secrecy) or can be made arbitrarily small for all sufficiently large d (strong secrecy). Since the
additive noise is independent of everything else, X → U+V→ U+V+Z forms a Markov chain, and using
the data processing inequality, I(X; U+V+Z) ≤ I(X; U+V). Likewise, I(Y ; U+V+Z) ≤ I(Y ; U+V).
Therefore, any scheme that achieves perfect (strong) secrecy in the absence of noise will also achieve perfect
(strong) secrecy in a noisy channel.
The messages must also be protected from corruption by the additive noise in the multiple access phase.
Since the messages are uniformly distributed over G(d), 1d log2 |G(d)| gives the average number of bits of
information sent to the relay by each user node in one channel use in the MAC phase. Our aim will be to
ensure secure computation of X ⊕ Y at the highest possible rate (which we define to be 1d log2 |G(d)|) for a
given power constraint at the user nodes. To formalize these notions, we have the following definition:
Definition 1. For a positive integer d, a (d,M (d)) code for the MAC phase of the bidirectional relay channel
with user nodes A, B and relay R consists of the following:
1) Messages: Nodes A and B possess messages X and Y , respectively, drawn independently and uniformly
from a finite Abelian group G(d) with M (d) = |G(d)| elements.
2) Codebook: The codebook, denoted by C, is a discrete subset of Rd, not necessarily finite. The elements
of C are called codewords. The codebook consists of all those vectors that are allowed to be transmitted
by the user nodes to the relay.
3) Encoders: The encoder at each node is a randomized mapping from G(d) to Rd, specified by the
distributions pU|X(u|x) = Pr[U = u|X = x] and pV|Y (v|y) = Pr[V = v|Y = y] for all u,v ∈ C
and x, y ∈ G(d). At node A, given a message x ∈ G(d) as input, the encoder outputs a codeword u ∈ C
at random, according to pU|X(u|x). Similarly, at node B, with y as input, the encoder outputs v ∈ C
according to pV|Y (v|y). The messages x and y are encoded independently. The rate of the code is defined
to be
R(d) = log2M
(d)
d
. (4)
The code has an average transmit power per dimension defined as
P (d) = 1
d
E‖U‖2 = 1
d
E‖V‖2. (5)
2Equivalently, we want W ⊥ X and W ⊥ Y .
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94) Decoder: The relay R receives a vector W ∈ R(d) as given in (3). The decoder, D(d) : Rd → G(d) maps
the received vector to an element of the set of messages. The average probability of error of the decoder
is defined as
η(d) := E
[
Pr[D(d)(W) 6= X ⊕ Y ]],
where E denotes expectation over the messages, X,Y , and over the encoders (U,V given X,Y ).
IV. Perfect Secrecy
We first study the case where perfect statistical independence between U+V and the individual messages
is required, and the relay must be able to reliably compute X ⊕ Y (where ⊕ denotes addition within G(d))
from the received vector. To summarize, we have the following requirements for secure compute-and-forward:
(S1) (U, X) ⊥ (V, Y ).
(S2) (U + V) ⊥ X and (U + V) ⊥ Y .
(S3) U + V almost surely determines X ⊕ Y .
If conditions (S1)–(S3) are satisfied, the relay has no means of finding the individual messages. Property (S3)
ensures that the relay can decode X ⊕ Y , which can then be encoded/modulated for further transmission
over the broadcast channel. On reception of the broadcast message, since user A (resp. B) knows X (resp.
Y ), it can recover Y (resp. X).
If the relay only had access to X ⊕ Y instead of U + V, the problem of secure communication would
have been trivial due to the uniformity and independence of X and Y . However, the relay receives the real
sum of U and V, which makes the problem harder. For example, suppose that d = 1, and G(1) = Z2, the
group of integers modulo 2. Consider the coding scheme U = X, and V = Y . Then, in the absence of noise,
whenever U + V = 0 or U + V = 2, the relay can determine both X and Y .
The performance of a coding scheme is generally evaluated in terms of the average transmit power, and
the transmission rate. To make these notions formal, we define achievable power-rate pairs as follows.
Definition 2. A power-rate pair (P,R) is achievable with perfect secrecy if, for every δ > 0, there exists a
sequence of (d,M (d)) codes such that
• conditions (S1)–(S3) are satisfied for all d,
and for all sufficiently large d,
• the transmission rate, R(d), is greater than R− δ;
• the average transmit power per dimension P (d), is less than P + δ; and
• the average probability of decoding error, η(d), is less than δ.
The objective of the next couple of sections will be to prove the following result.
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10
Theorem 1. A power-rate pair of (
P,
[
1
2 log2
P
σ2
− log2(2e)
]+)
is achievable with perfect secrecy in the MAC phase of the bidirectional relay.
V. Perfect secrecy: The Noiseless Setting
To get a clear picture as to how secure communication can be achieved, we first describe the binary case.
The messages X and Y are chosen independently and uniformly at random from {0, 1}, or equivalently, the
set of integers modulo-2 (G = Z2). They are modulated to U and V respectively, which take values in R.
Studying the one-dimensional case will give us the intuition needed to tackle the general case, and we will
see that the techniques developed here extend quite naturally to the d-dimensional setting.
We will show that there exist distributions on U and V that permit secure computation defined by
properties (S1)–(S3). This is somewhat surprising since we cannot have non-degenerate real-valued random
variables U, V that satisfy (U + V ) ⊥ U and (U + V ) ⊥ V , as shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let U and V be independent real-valued random variables, and let + denote addition over
R. Then, we have (U + V ) ⊥ U and (U + V ) ⊥ V iff U and V are constant a.s. (i.e., there exist a, b ∈ R
such that Pr[U = a] = Pr[V = b] = 1).
Proof: The “if” part is trivial, so let us prove the “only if” part. Let W = U+V , so that by assumption,
U , V and W are pairwise independent. Let ϕU , ϕV and ϕW denote the characteristic functions of U , V and
W , respectively. In particular, ϕW = ϕUϕV . From U = W − V , we also have that ϕU = ϕWϕV , where ϕV
denotes the complex conjugate of ϕV . Putting the two equalities together, we obtain ϕU = ϕU |ϕV |2. To be
precise, ϕU (t) = ϕU (t)|ϕV (t)|2 for all t ∈ R.
Now, characteristic functions are continuous and take the value 1 at t = 0. Hence, ϕU is non-zero within
the interval [−δ, δ] for some δ > 0. Thus, |ϕV (t)| = 1 for all t ∈ [−δ, δ]. By a basic property of characteristic
functions (see Lemma 4 of Section XV.1 in [17]), this implies that there exists b ∈ R such that ϕV (t) = eibt
for all t ∈ R, thus proving that V = b with probability 1.
A similar argument using V = W − U shows that U is also constant with probability 1.
A. Secure Computation of XOR at the Relay
In this section, X and Y are independent and identically distributed (iid) uniform binary random variables
(rvs), and X ⊕ Y denotes their modulo-2 sum (XOR). We describe a construction of integer-valued rvs U
and V satisfying the properties (S1)–(S3).
1) Conditions on PMFs and Characteristic Functions: We first derive conditions under which integer-
valued rvs U and V can satisfy the desired properties. We introduce some notation: for k ∈ Z, let pU (k) =
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Pr[U = k], pV (k) = Pr[V = k], and for a ∈ {0, 1}, let pU |a(k) = Pr[U = k | X = a], pV |a(k) = Pr[V = k |
Y = a]. Thus, pU = (1/2)(pU |0 + pU |1) and pV = (1/2)(pV |0 + pV |1).
Property (S1) is equivalent to requiring that the joint probability mass function (pmf) of (U, V,X, Y ) be
expressible as
pUVXY (k, l, a, b) = (1/2)(1/2)pU |a(k)pV |b(l) (6)
for k, l ∈ Z and a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Without the requirement that U + V ⊥ X and U + V ⊥ Y , it is trivial to
define U and V such that (S3) is satisfied: for example, take U = X and V = Y . Property (S3) is satisfied
by any U, V such that
pU |0(k) = pV |0(k) = 0 for all odd k ∈ Z,
pU |1(k) = pV |1(k) = 0 for all even k ∈ Z.
(7)
Finally, we turn our attention to (S2). We want (U +V ) ⊥ X and (U +V ) ⊥ Y . Let us define, for k ∈ Z,
pU+V (k) = Pr[U + V = k], and for a ∈ {0, 1}, pU+V |X=a(k) = Pr[U + V = k | X = a] and pU+V |Y=a(k) =
Pr[U + V = k | Y = a]. Assuming (U,X) ⊥ (V, Y ), we have pU+V = pU ∗ pV , pU+V |X=a = pU |a ∗ pV , and
pU+V |Y=a = pU ∗ pV |a, where ∗ denotes the convolution operation. Thus, when (U,X) ⊥ (V, Y ), (S2) holds
iff
pU ∗ pV = pU |a ∗ pV = pU ∗ pV |a for a ∈ {0, 1}. (8)
It helps to view this in the Fourier domain. Let ϕU , ϕV , ϕU |a etc. denote the respective characteristic
functions of the pmfs pU , pV , pU |a etc. — for example, ϕU |a(t) =
∑
k∈Z pU |a(k)eikt. Then, (8) is equivalent
to
ϕUϕV = ϕU |aϕV = ϕUϕV |a for a ∈ {0, 1}. (9)
Note that ϕU = (1/2)(ϕU |0 + ϕU |1) and ϕV = (1/2)(ϕV |0 + ϕV |1). Hence, (9) should be viewed as a
requirement on the conditional pmfs pU |a and pV |a, a ∈ {0, 1}.
In summary, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the conditional pmfs pU |a and pV |a, a ∈ {0, 1}, satisfy (7) and (9). Then, the rvs
U, V,X, Y with joint pmf given by (6) have properties (S1)–(S3).
The observations made up to this point also allow us to prove the following negative result.3
Proposition 4. Properties (S1)–(S3) cannot be satisfied by integer-valued rvs U, V that are finitely supported.
Proof: Suppose that U and V are finitely supported Z-valued rvs. Then, ϕU (t) and ϕV (t) are finite
linear combinations of some exponentials eik1t, . . . , eiknt. Equivalently, the real and imaginary parts of ϕU
and ϕV are trigonometric polynomials. Thus, either ϕU (resp. ϕV ) is identically zero, or it has a discrete
3In fact, a stronger negative result can be shown — see Proposition 9.
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set of zeros. The former is impossible as ϕU (0) = ϕV (0) = 1. Now, suppose that (S1) and (S2) are satisfied,
which means that (9) must hold. The equality ϕUϕV = ϕUϕV |a in (9) implies that ϕV |a(t) = ϕV (t) for all t
such that ϕU (t) 6= 0. But since ϕU (t) has a discrete set of zeros, continuity of characteristic functions in fact
implies that ϕV |a(t) = ϕV (t) for all t. An analogous argument shows that ϕU |a(t) = ϕU (t) for all t. Hence,
U ⊥ X and V ⊥ Y . From this, and (S1), we obtain that U + V ⊥ X ⊕ Y , thus precluding (S3).
Practical communication systems generally have a maximum power constraint, which means that we would
like to have U, V be finitely supported. But from Proposition 4, we see that it is not possible to have finitely
supported U, V that permit secure computation of the XOR at the relay. Therefore, in order to ensure secure
computation, we will have to relax the power constraint to an average power constraint on the user nodes.
This means that we require finite-variance, integer-valued random variables U, V , with infinite support, that
satisfy properties (S1)–(S3), or equivalently, the hypotheses of Lemma 3.
We now give a construction of U, V that satisfy the hypotheses of Lemma 3. We will choose a density
function whose characteristic function is compactly supported. The random variables U and V are chosen
according to a distribution obtained by sampling and appropriately normalizing this density function. To
study this in more detail, we rely upon methods and results from Fourier analysis. The key tool we need is the
Poisson summation formula, which we briefly recall here. Our description is based largely on Section XIX.5
in [17].
B. The Poisson Summation Formula
Fix a positive integer d, and let Λ be a full-rank lattice in Rd. Recall from Section II-A that Λˆ denotes
the Fourier dual of Λ.
Let ψ : Rd → C be the characteristic function of a Rd-valued random variable, such that ∫Rd |ψ(t)| dt <∞.
In particular, ψ is continuous and ψ(0) = 1. Since ψ is absolutely integrable, the random variable has a
continuous density f : Rd → R+. The Poisson summation formula can be expressed as follows: for any
s ∈ Rd, we have for all ζ ∈ Rd,∑
n∈Λˆ
ψ(ζ + n) e−i〈n, s〉 = (det Λ)
∑
k∈Λ
f(k + s) ei〈k+s, ζ〉, (10)
provided that the series on the left converges to a continuous function Ψ(ζ). It should be pointed out that
texts in Fourier analysis typically state the Poisson summation formula for an arbitrary L1 function f , and
would then require that f and ψ decay sufficiently quickly — see e.g., [34, Chapter VII, Corollary 2.6] or [3,
Eq. (17.1.2)] — for (10) to hold. However, as argued by Feller in proving the formula in the one-dimensional
setting [17, Chapter XIX, equation (5.9)], in the special case of a non-negative L1 function f , it is sufficient
to assume that the left-hand side (LHS) of (10) converges to a continuous function Ψ(ζ).
Note that Ψ(0) = (det Λ)
∑
k∈Λ f(k+s), which is a non-negative quantity. If Ψ(0) 6= 0, then dividing both
sides of (10) by Ψ(0) yields the important fact that Ψ(ζ)/Ψ(0) is the characteristic function of a discrete
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random variable supported within the set Λ + s := {k + s : k ∈ Λ}, the probability mass at the point k + s
being equal to f(k + s)/
∑
`∈Λ f(`+ s).
A special case of interest is when ψ is compactly supported; specifically, it is supported within the
fundamental Voronoi region of Λˆ: ψ(t) = 0 for all t /∈ V(Λˆ). In this case, we can readily show that the
series on the LHS of (10) converges to a continuous function Ψ. Indeed, if we define ψ˜(t) := ψ(t)e−i〈t,s〉,
then the series on the LHS of (10) may be written as Ψ(ζ) := ei〈ζ,s〉Ψ˜(ζ), where
Ψ˜(ζ) :=
∑
n∈Λˆ
ψ˜(ζ + n).
Now, recall that ψ, being a characteristic function, is continuous on Rd; hence, so is ψ˜. Also, by assumption,
ψ is supported within V(Λˆ); hence, so is ψ˜. In particular, by continuity, ψ˜ must be 0 on the boundary of
V(Λˆ); therefore, the supports of ψ˜(·) and ψ˜(· + n) do not intersect for any non-zero n ∈ Λˆ. From this, we
infer that Ψ˜, which is formed by the superposition of continuous functions with disjoint supports, must be
continuous. Hence, we can conclude that Ψ(ζ) = ei〈ζ,s〉Ψ˜(ζ) is a continuous function.
Moreover, it is clear that Ψ(0) = ψ(0), and since ψ is a characteristic function, ψ(0) = 1. As explained
above, this shows that Ψ is the characteristic function of a discrete rv supported within Λ + s. In fact, by
plugging in ζ = 0 in (10) we obtain that Ψ(0) = (det Λ)
∑
k∈Λ f(k + s), which shows that
∑
k∈Λ f(k + s) =
1/(det Λ). For future reference, we summarize this in the form of a proposition.
Proposition 5. Let Λ be a full-rank lattice in Rd. Let ψ : Rd → C be a characteristic function such that
ψ(t) = 0 for all t /∈ V(Λˆ), and let f : Rd → R+ be the corresponding probability density function. Then, for
any s ∈ Rd, the function Ψ : Rd → C defined by
Ψ(ζ) =
∑
n∈Λˆ
ψ(ζ + n) e−i〈n, s〉
is the characteristic function of a random variable supported within the set Λ + s := {k + s : k ∈ Λ}. The
probability mass at the point k + s is equal to (det Λ) f(k + s).
It should be noted that compactly supported characteristic functions do indeed exist — see e.g., [17,
Section XV.2, Table 1], [12], [31]. We also give an explicit construction in Example 1 in Section V-C.
Applying Proposition 5 to the one-dimensional lattice TZ = {kT : k ∈ Z}, with T > 0, we obtain the
corollary below.
Corollary 6. Let ψ be a characteristic function of a real-valued random variable such that ψ(t) = 0 whenever
|t| ≥ pi/T for some T > 0, and let f be the corresponding probability density function. Then, for any s ∈ R,
the function Ψ : R→ C defined by
Ψ(ζ) =
∞∑
n=−∞
ψ(ζ + 2npi/T ) e−is(2npi/T )
is the characteristic function of a discrete random variable supported within the set {kT + s : k ∈ Z}. The
probability mass at the point kT + s is equal to Tf(kT + s).
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−pi −pi/2 0 pi/2 pi
1
t
ψ(t)
Fig. 5. A generic characteristic function supported on [−pi/2, pi/2].
This corollary plays a central role in the construction described next.
C. Construction of Z-Valued RVs Satisfying (S1)–(S3)
We now describe the construction of integer-valued rvs that satisfy (S1)–(S3). Let ψ be a characteristic
function (of a continuous rv X) with the properties that
(C1) ψ(t) = 0 for |t| ≥ pi/2, and
(C2) ψ(t) is real and non-negative for all t ∈ R.4
A generic such ψ is depicted in Figure 5; we give a specific example a little later in this section. Since ψ
is real-valued, it must be an even function: ψ(−t) = ψ(t) for all t ∈ R. Also, ψ(0) = 1. Moreover, since
ψ is integrable over R, by the Fourier inversion formula, the rv X has a continuous density f . Note that
Corollary 6 holds for T ≤ 2.
Let ϕ be the periodic function with period 2pi that agrees with ψ on [−pi, pi], as depicted in Figure 6. Note
that ϕ(ζ) =
∑∞
n=−∞ ψ(ζ + 2pin). Thus, applying Corollary 6 with T = 1 and s = 0, we find that ϕ is the
characteristic function of an integer-valued rv, with pmf given by
p(k) = f(k) for all k ∈ Z. (11)
Next, for s = 0, 1, define ϕs as follows: for ζ ∈ R,
ϕs(ζ) =
∞∑
n=−∞
ψ(ζ + npi)e−isnpi.
It is easily seen that ϕ0 is the periodic extension of ψ with period pi, i.e., ϕ0 is the periodic function with
period pi that agrees with ψ on [−pi/2, pi/2], as depicted at the top of Figure 7 for a generic ψ shown in
Figure 5. On the other hand, ϕ1 is periodic with period 2pi: its graph is obtained from that of ϕ0 by reflecting
about the ζ-axis every second copy of ψ, as depicted at the bottom of Figure 7.
4There is no loss of generality in imposing this requirement. Suppose that an rv X has characteristic function ψ, which is
complex-valued in general. Let X1, X2 be iid rvs with the same distribution as X. Then, X1 −X2 has characteristic function
ψψ¯ = |ψ|2.
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−pi −pi/2 0−3pi/2−2pi−5pi/2−3pi pi/2 pi 3pi/2 2pi 5pi/2 3pi
1
ϕ(t)
t
Fig. 6. Period-2pi extension of generic ψ from Figure 5.
−pi −pi/2 0−3pi/2−2pi−5pi/2−3pi pi/2 pi 3pi/2 2pi 5pi/2 3pi
1
−3pi −5pi/2 −2pi −3pi/2 −pi −pi/2 0 pi/2 pi 3pi/2 2pi 5pi/2 3pi
1
−1
t
ϕ0(t)
t
ϕ1(t)
Fig. 7. The periodic functions ϕ0 and ϕ1 derived from ψ.
Applying Corollary 6 with T = 2 and s ∈ {0, 1}, we get that ϕ0 and ϕ1 are characteristic functions of rvs
supported within the even and odd integers, respectively. The pmf corresponding to ϕ0 is given by
p0(k) =
2f(k) if k is an even integer0 otherwise. (12)
and that corresponding to ϕ1 is
p1(k) =
2f(k) if k is an odd integer0 otherwise. (13)
From (11)–(13), we have p(k) = 12 (p0(k) + p1(k)) for all k ∈ Z.
Finally, note that since ϕ0(t) and ϕ1(t) differ from ϕ(t) only when ϕ(t) = 0, we have
ϕ2 = ϕϕ0 = ϕϕ1. (14)
With these facts in hand, we can describe the construction of Z-valued rvs U and V satisfying properties
(S1)–(S3). Set pU |0 = pV |0 = p0 and pU |1 = pV |1 = p1. This implies that pU = pV = p, where p is as defined
in (11). Clearly, (7) holds. To verify (9), note that, by virtue of (14), we have for a ∈ {0, 1},
ϕUϕV = ϕ2 = ϕϕa.
But, by construction, ϕUϕV |a = ϕV ϕU |a = ϕϕa. Therefore, by Lemma 3, the rvs (U, V,X, Y ) with joint pmf
given by (6) have the properties (S1)–(S3).
Recall from the discussion following Proposition 4 that we need the rvs U and V to have finite variance. To
ensure this, we use the fact [17, pp. 512–513] that a probability distribution F with characteristic function
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χ has finite variance iff χ is twice differentiable; in this case, χ′(0) = iµ and χ′′(0) = −µ2, where µ and
µ2 are the mean and second moment of F . Thus, the rvs U and V (with pmf p as above) have finite
variance iff the characteristic function ϕ is twice differentiable. In this case, as ϕ is real, so is ϕ′(0), which
implies that U and V have zero mean. Hence, their variances are equal to their second moments, and so,
Var(U) = Var(V ) = −ϕ′′(0). By construction, ϕ is twice differentiable iff ψ is twice differentiable and
ϕ′′(0) = ψ′′(0). We summarize our construction of the rvs U and V in the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let X,Y be iid Bernoulli(1/2) rvs. Suppose that we are given a probability density function
f : R → R+ with a non-negative real characteristic function ψ such that ψ(t) = 0 for |t| ≥ pi/2. Set
pU |0 = pV |0 = p0 and pU |1 = pV |1 = p1, where p0 and p1 are as in (12) and 13). Then, the resulting Z-valued
rvs U and V satisfy properties (S1)–(S3). Additionally, the rvs U and V have finite variance iff ψ is twice
differentiable, in which case the variance equals −ψ′′(0).
Based on Theorem 7, secure computation of XOR at the relay works as follows: the nodes A and B
modulate their bits independently to an integer k, with probability p0(k) (from (12)) if the bit is 0, or
with probability p1(k) (from (13)) if the bit is 1. The probability distributions can be chosen such that the
modulated symbols have finite average power. The average transmit power is equal to the variance of the
modulated random variable, which is −ψ′′(0), and a handle on this can be obtained by choosing ψ carefully.
The relay receives the sum of the two integers, which is independent of the individual bits X and Y (of A
and B respectively). However, the XOR of the two bits can be recovered at R with probability 1. This is
done by simply mapping the received integer W to 1, if W is odd, and 0 if W is even. To gain a better
understanding of the construction of the rvs, let us see an example.
Example 1. Consider the density (from [17, Section XV.2, Table 1])
f(x) =

1
2pi if x = 0
1−cos x
pix2 if x 6= 0
(15)
which has characteristic function
fˆ(t) = max{0, 1− |t|} (16)
The function fˆ is plotted in Figure 8. In particular, fˆ(t) = 0 for |t| ≥ 1.
The function fˆ is compactly supported but it is not differentiable at 0. This can be rectified by considering
instead g = fˆ ∗ fˆ , where ∗ denotes convolution, which can be explicitly computed to be
g(t) = (fˆ ∗ fˆ)(t) =

1
2 |t|3 − t2 + 23 if |t| ≤ 1
1
6 (2− |t|)3 if 1 ≤ |t| ≤ 2
0 otherwise
(17)
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0
1
1
fˆ(t)
t
−1
Fig. 8. fˆ(t) = max{0, 1− |t|}.
Now, define h(x) := (3pi2/4) [f(pix/4)]2, with f as in (15). We prove in Appendix A that h is a probability
density function whose characteristic function is given by
ψ(t) = 32 g(
4t
pi ),
where g is as in (17). It can be directly verified that ψ is non-negative with ψ(t) = 0 for |t| ≥ pi/2, and that
ψ is twice differentiable, with ψ′′(0) = −48/pi2.
Thus, rvs U and V can be constructed as in Theorem 7 with var(U) = var(V ) = 48/pi2.
Remark 8. It is even possible to construct compactly supported C∞ characteristic functions. Constructions
of such functions are given in [31]. In fact, [31] constructs compactly supported characteristic functions ψ
such that the corresponding density functions f are even functions satisfying limx→∞ xmf(x) = 0 for all
m > 0. This implies that all the absolute moments
∫∞
−∞ |x|mf(x) dx exist, and hence, ψ is a C∞ function
(see [17, p. 512]). If such a characteristic function ψ is used in the construction described in Theorem 7, then
the resulting Z-valued rvs U, V will have pmfs pU (k), pV (k) whose tails decay faster than any polynomial in
k. To be precise, limk→∞ kmpU (k) = limk→∞ kmpV (k) = 0 for any m > 0.
The above remark shows that we can have Z-valued rvs U, V satisfying properties (S1)–(S3), with pmfs
decaying faster than any polynomial. However, the rate of decay cannot be much faster than that. Indeed, it
is not possible to construct Z-valued rvs with exponentially decaying pmfs that satisfy properties (S1)–(S3).
Define a pmf p(k), k ∈ Z, to be light-tailed if there are positive constants C and λ such that p(k) ≤ Cλ−|k|
for all sufficiently large |k|.
Proposition 9. Properties (S1)–(S3) cannot be satisfied by integer-valued rvs U, V having light-tailed pmfs.
Proof.5 Suppose that U, V are Z-valued rvs satisfying (S1) and (S2). Using ϕU = (1/2)(ϕU |0 + ϕU |1) and
ϕV = (1/2)(ϕV |0 + ϕV |1) in (9), we readily obtain
ϕ2U |0 = ϕ2U |1 and ϕ2V |0 = ϕ2V |1. (18)
5This proof was conveyed to the authors by Manjunath Krishnapur.
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If U, V have light-tailed pmfs, then pU |a and pV |a, a ∈ {0, 1}, must also be light-tailed, since pU |a ≤ 2pU
and pV |a ≤ 2pV . The key observation is that the characteristic function of a light-tailed pmf is real-analytic,
i.e., it has a power series expansion
∑∞
n=0 cnt
n, with cn ∈ C, that is valid for all t ∈ R [23, Chapter 7].
Thus, ϕU |a and ϕV |a, for a ∈ {0, 1}, are real-analytic. It follows by comparing power series coefficients, that
if functions g and h are real-analytic and g2 = h2, then either g = h or g = −h. Applying this to (18), we
find that ϕU |0 = ±ϕU |1, and similarly for V . In fact, since ϕU and ϕV cannot be identically 0, we actually
have ϕU |0 = ϕU |1 = ϕU , and similarly for V . This implies that U ⊥ X and V ⊥ Y . From this, and (S1),
we obtain that U + V ⊥ X ⊕ Y , thus precluding (S3).
D. Extension to Finite Abelian Groups
A close look at the modulations in the previous section reveals the following structure: we had a fine
lattice Λ = Z and a coarse lattice Λ0 = 2Z, with the quotient group Λ/Λ0, consisting of the two cosets 2Z
and 1 + 2Z, making up the probabilistically-chosen modulation alphabet. Given a message X ∈ Λ/Λ0, the
encoder outputs a random point from the coset X according to a carefully chosen probability distribution.
Note that the quotient group in this case is isomorphic to Z2, and this enables recovery of the XOR of the
bits (addition in Z2) from integer addition of the transmitted symbols modulo the coarse lattice. Also, the
choice of the probability distribution (from Theorem 7) ensures that the choice of coset at each transmitter
is independent of the integer sum at the relay. We shall extend the construction described in the previous
subsection to d dimensions, thereby obtaining a scheme that satisfies properties (S1)–(S3).
Now, any finite Abelian group G can be expressed as the quotient group Λ/Λ0 for some pair of nested
lattices Λ0 ⊆ Λ. Indeed, any such G is isomorphic to a direct sum of cyclic groups: G ∼= ZN1⊕ZN2⊕· · ·⊕ZNk
for some positive integers N1, N2, . . . , Nk [20, Theorem 2.14.1]. Here, ZNj denotes the group of integers
modulo-Nj . Taking Λ = Zd and Λ0 = AT Zd, where A is the diagonal matrix diag(N1, N2, . . . , Nk), we have
G ∼= Λ/Λ0. So, the finite Abelian group case is equivalent to considering the quotient group, i.e., the group
of cosets, of a coarse lattice Λ0 within a fine lattice Λ. These lattices may be taken to be full-rank lattices
in Rd.
As an example, let N ≥ 2 be an integer, and let ZN = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} denote the set of integers modulo
N . Let X,Y be iid random variables uniformly distributed over ZN , and let X⊕Y now denote their modulo-
N sum. Similar to the binary case discussed so far, given a non-negative real characteristic function ψ such
that ψ(t) = 0 for |t| ≥ pi/N , we can construct Z-valued random variables U, V , jointly distributed with
X,Y , for which properties (S1)–(S3) hold. In this case, the finite Abelian group can be taken as the group
of cosets of the coarse lattice NZ within the fine lattice Z, which is isomorphic to ZN .
Let Λ0 be a sublattice of Λ of index M (i.e., the number of cosets of Λ0 in Λ is M). List the cosets of Λ0
in Λ as Λ0,Λ1, . . . ,ΛM−1, which constitute the quotient group G = Λ/Λ0. As before, ⊕ denotes addition
within G.
Consider rvs X,Y uniformly distributed over G. We wish to construct rvs U, V taking values in Λ, having
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the properties (S1)–(S3). The following theorem shows that this is possible. Here, R+ denotes the set of all
non-negative real numbers.
Theorem 10. Suppose that ψ : Rd → R+ is the characteristic function of a probability density function
f : Rd → R+, such that ψ(t) = 0 for t /∈ V(Λˆ0), where Λˆ0 is the Fourier dual of Λ0. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1,
define the pmf pj as follows:
pj(k) =
|det Λ0|f(k) if k ∈ Λj0 otherwise. (19)
Finally, define a random variable U (resp. V ) jointly distributed with X (resp. Y ) as follows: if X = Λj
(resp. Y = Λj), U (resp. V ) is a random point from Λj picked according to the distribution pj. Then, the
resulting Λ-valued rvs U, V satisfy properties (S1)–(S3). Additionally, E‖U‖2 and E‖V ‖2 are finite iff ψ is
twice differentiable at 0, in which case E‖U‖2 = E‖V ‖2 = −∆ψ(0), where ∆ = ∑dj=1 ∂2j is the Laplacian
operator.
As with Theorem 7 and XOR, the above theorem allows for secure computation at the relay of the group
operation X⊕Y . The theorem is proved using Proposition 5, in a manner completely analogous to Theorem 7.
The interested reader is directed to Appendix B for the proof.
Constructing compactly supported twice-differentiable (or even C∞) characteristic functions ψ : Rd → R+,
d ≥ 1, is straightforward, given our previous constructions of such functions from R to R+. Suppose that
for i = 1, 2, . . . , d, ψi : R → R+ is the characteristic function of a random variable Xi, such that ψi(t) = 0
for |t| ≥ λi, with λi > 0, and X1, X2, . . . , Xd are mutually independent. Then, ψ(t1, . . . , td) =
∏d
i=1 ψi(ti)
is the characteristic function of the random vector X = (X1, . . . , Xd). Note that ψ is compactly supported:
ψ(t) = 0 for t /∈ ∏di=1(−λi, λi). Moreover, if the ψis are twice-differentiable (or C∞) for all i, then so is ψ.
Constructions other than product constructions are also in abundance; see e.g., [12], [31] and Theorem 11
below. A smooth, compactly supported characteristic function in R2 is depicted in Figure 9.
Our objective is to design codes (as defined in Definition 1) for secure computation at the relay. With
the construction described above, the rate of the code depends on the number of cosets, M , of Λ0 in Λ.
For a given average power constraint, the system designer is usually faced with the task of maximizing
the rate. Equivalently, for a given rate, the average transmit power must be kept as small as possible. The
transmit power is equal to the second moment of U (or V). Therefore, while any characteristic function ψ
supported within V(Λˆ0) suffices for the construction of Theorem 10, we must use a ψ for which −∆ψ(0) is
the least among such ψ’s. This would yield random variables U and V of least second moment (and hence
least transmit power), and having the desired properties.
It is evident that by simply scaling the nested lattice pair, the average transmit power may be made
as small as required. Suppose that the random vectors U and V, distributed over a fine lattice Λ, have
second moment P . Then, for any α > 0, the random variables U′ = αU and V′ = αV, distributed over
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Fig. 9. Example of a characteristic function supported within V(2Z2).
αΛ := {αz : z ∈ Λ} have second moment α2P . Choosing a small enough α would suffice to satisfy the power
constraint. However, as we will see in the following sections, when we have to deal with the additive noise
in the MAC channel, it is not possible to scale down the lattice arbitrarily if the probability of error is to
be made small. Also, for a given (fixed) coarse lattice, it turns out that the second moment (which depends
solely on the choice of ψ) cannot be made arbitrarily small. Indeed, the following result, adapted from [12],
gives a precise and complete answer to the question of how small −∆ψ(0) can be for a characteristic function
ψ supported within a ball of radius ρ in Rd.
Theorem 11 ([12], Theorem 5.1). Fix a ρ > 0. If ψ is a characteristic function of a random variable
distributed over Rd such that ψ(t) = 0 for ‖t‖ ≥ ρ, then
−∆ψ(0) ≥ 4
ρ2
j2d−2
2
, (20)
with equality iff ψ(t) = ψ˜(t/ρ) for ψ˜ = ωd∗˜ωd. Here, jk denotes the first positive zero of the Bessel function
Jk. Also, ωd(t) = γd Ωd(2‖t‖j d−2
2
) for ‖t‖ ≤ 1/2 and ωd(t) = 0 for ‖t‖ > 1/2, and
ωd∗˜ωd(t) =
∫
ωd(τ )ωd(t + τ ) dτ
denotes the folded-over self convolution of ωd, with ωd(t) denoting the complex conjugate of ωd(t). Further-
more, for t ∈ R,
Ωd(t) = Γ(d/2)
(2
t
) d−2
2
J d−2
2
(t)
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and
γ2d =
4jd−2d−2
2
pid/2Γ(d/2)J2d
2
(j d−2
2
) ,
where Γ(·) denotes the Gamma function. The density f corresponding to the minimum-variance ψ is given
by f(x) = ρdf˜(ρx), where
f˜(x) = cd
(
Ωd(‖x‖/2)
j2d−2
2
− (‖x‖/2)2
)2
, (21)
where
cd =
4j2d−2
2
4dpid/2Γ(d/2) .
Remark 12. Observe that Theorem 10 is true for any nested lattice pair (Λ,Λ0). As long as ψ(t) is a
characteristic function supported within V(Λˆ0), we have an encoding scheme that satisfies (S1)–(S3). If we
restrict ψ to be supported within a ball of radius ρ, which is contained within V(Λˆ0), then Theorem 11 gives
us a suitable candidate for ψ that can be used to obtain perfect secrecy. Since we are interested in minimizing
the transmission power, we can choose ρ to be as large as rpack(Λˆ0), where rpack(Λˆ0) denotes the packing
radius of Λˆ0. Hence, we now have a coding scheme that achieves perfect secrecy for any arbitrary nested lattice
pair. This is rather interesting, since earlier work on weak and strong secrecy using lattices [18], [19], [22]
invariably required that the nested lattices satisfy certain goodness properties. Therefore, ours is an explicit
scheme which specifies, for any nested lattice pair, a distribution to be used for randomization at the encoder
in order to obtain perfect secrecy. In particular, our randomization scheme can also be used in conjunction
with “practical” lattice coding schemes (e.g., [10], [32], [38]) that have low decoding complexity.
VI. The Gaussian Noise Setting
Given any nested lattice pair, we now have a scheme whereby the relay can compute X ⊕ Y from U + V,
but cannot determine X or Y separately. We next consider the scenario where the symbols received by the
relay are corrupted by noise, and prove the achievability of the power-rate pairs described in Theorem 1.
Recall that in the MAC phase, the relay receives
W = U + V + Z,
where Z is zero-mean iid Gaussian noise with variance σ2. The coding scheme that we use is largely based
on the work in [13], [25], and is described below.
A. Coding Scheme for Perfect Secrecy
We now describe the sequence of (d,M (d)) (recall Definition 1) codes that achieve perfect secrecy.
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X ∈ G(d) w′ Coset
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wu Estimate
of X ⊕ Y
QΛ(·)
Fig. 10. The operations performed by the user nodes and the relay.
Code: A (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) nested lattice code consists of a pair of full-rank nested lattices Λ
(d)
0 ⊆ Λ(d) in Rd. The
messages are chosen from the group G(d) = Λ(d)/Λ(d)0 , whose M (d) := |Λ(d)/Λ(d)0 | elements are listed as
Λ0,Λ1, . . . ,ΛM(d)−1.
Encoding: We have messages X,Y at nodes A, B that are independent rvs, uniformly distributed over G(d).
We first pick a characteristic function ψ supported within V(Λˆ(d)0 ), as needed in Theorem 10. We impose
the restriction that ψ be supported within a ball centered at 0 with radius equal to the packing radius,
rpack(Λˆ(d)0 ), of the dual lattice Λˆ
(d)
0 . Recall that the packing radius is, by definition, the largest radius of
a ball centered at 0 that is contained within V(Λˆ(d)0 ). So, if ψ(t) = 0 for ‖t‖ ≥ rpack(Λˆ0), then ψ(t) is
certainly supported within V(Λˆ0). If X = Λj , node A transmits a random vector U ∈ Λj picked according to
the distribution pj of Theorem 10. Similarly, if Y = Λk, node B transmits a random vector V ∈ Λk picked
according to the distribution pk. The rate of transmission from A or B is R(d) = 1d log2M (d). The average
transmit power per dimension at each node is P (d) = −∆ψ(0)d , as in Theorem 10.
From Theorem 11, we see that an average transmit power per dimension as low as
P (d) =
4j2d−2
2
d
(
rpack(Λˆ(d)0 )
)2 , (22)
is achievable by a suitable choice of ψ. It was shown in [35] (see also [16]) that the first positive zero of the
Bessel function Jk can be written as jk = k + bk1/3 + O(k−1/3), where b is a constant independent of k.
Therefore,
P (d) = d
rpack2(Λˆ(d)0 )
(1 + od(1)), (23)
where od(1)→ 0 as d→∞, is achievable by a suitable choice of ψ using Theorem 11.
Decoding: The relay R receives W = U + V + Z, where Z is a Gaussian noise vector with d independent
N (0, σ2) components, which are all independent of U and V. The relay estimates Λj⊕Λk to be the coset of
Λ(d)0 represented by QΛ(d)(W), the closest vector to W in the lattice Λ(d). The decoder mapping is denoted
by D(·).
Security: Since the noise Z is independent of everything else, Theorem 10 shows that W is independent of
the individual messages X,Y . Hence, even in the noisy setting, perfect security continues to be guaranteed
at the relay for any choice of the nested lattice code. It is worth reiterating that perfect secrecy can be
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guaranteed irrespective of the noise Z. The distribution of Z only determines the reliability of decoding,
which in turn influences the power-rate pairs achievable with perfect secrecy.
Reliability and achievable power-rate pairs: Let η(d) denote the average probability that QΛ(W) is different
from the coset to which U + V belongs. From Definition 2, a pair (P,R) is achievable if for every δ > 0,
there exists a sequence of nested lattice codes (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) for which the following hold for sufficiently large
d: R(d) > R− δ, P (d) < P + δ and η(d) < δ.
For a given nested lattice pair, Theorem 11 gives us the minimum average transmit power per dimension
that guarantees perfect secrecy (subject to the condition that the characteristic function is supported within
a ball of radius rpack(Λˆ(d)0 )), and the pmf pj that achieves the minimum. The choice of the nested lattices
affects the reliability of decoding X ⊕ Y at the relay, and consequently determines achievable transmission
rates. To guarantee secure and reliable computation at the relay, we restrict the class of nested lattice pairs
(Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) to those which satisfy the following “goodness” properties6:
(G1) The sequence of coarse lattices, {Λ(d)0 }, is good for covering and AWGN channel coding.
(G2) The sequence of dual lattices, {Λˆ(d)0 }, is good for packing.
(G3) The sequence of fine lattices, {Λ(d)}, is good for AWGN channel coding.
Unlike prior work on nested lattices [1], [13], [25], [27] which only required {Λ(d)0 } and {Λ(d)} to satisfy
properties (G1) and (G3) above, we have the additional requirement that the sequence of Fourier duals,
{Λˆ(d)0 } must be good for packing. While it is well established that there exist nested lattices satisfying
(G1) and (G3) [13], [14], [25], it turns out that the duals of most of these lattices also satisfy the goodness
properties. In the next section, we will formally describe an ensemble of lattices, also studied in [13], [25],
and show that most of the lattices in this ensemble satisfy all the above properties.
B. Good Ensembles of Nested Lattices with Good Duals
Our description of the construction of the (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) nested lattice codes is based on [13], [25]. Let d and
k be positive integers with k ≤ d, and let q be a prime number. Let Zq denote the field of integers modulo
q. The (d, k, q) ensemble of lattices (in the terminology of [14]) is used in the construction. A lattice from
the (d, k, q) ensemble is sampled as follows:
1) Choose a k× d matrix G with entries from Zq uniformly at random. Note that G need not be full-rank.
However, the probability that G is full-rank goes to 1 as (d− k) tends to ∞ [14]. The linear code over
Zq generated by G is denoted by C(G) = {(GTy) mod q : y ∈ Zkq}.
2) Apply Construction A on the code C(G). This is done as follows:
(c1) The codebook is scaled so that the scaled codewords lie within the d-dimensional unit cube: C′ =
(1/q)C(G) = {(1/q)x : x ∈ C(G)}.
6For definitions of lattices good for covering, packing, and AWGN channel coding, the reader is directed to Appendix C.
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(c2) The lattice is obtained by tessellating the entire space, Rd, with copies of C′, i.e., Λ(C) = C′+Zd :=
{c + x : c ∈ C′,x ∈ Zd}.
From the construction, it is clear that Zd is a sublattice of Λ(C). More detail regarding Construction-A
lattices can be found in [6]. We would like to make note of one important property of these lattices: if the
generator matrix of a Construction-A lattice Λ has rank d, then the effective radius of Λ is given by [14]
reff(Λ) =
(
Γ
(
d
2 + 1
)
pid/2qk
)1/d
. (24)
Choose a sequence of coarse lattices {Λ(d)0 }, each Λ(d)0 selected uniformly at random from the (d, k, q)
ensemble, where k and q may be functions of d chosen beforehand. For d ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}, let A(d) be the
generator matrix of the coarse lattice Λ(d)0 . For this choice of {Λ(d)0 }, we construct another ensemble of
lattices from which we pick the sequence of fine lattices {Λ(d)}. This consists of two steps:
(f1) Choose a sequence of lattices, {Λ˜(d)f }, with each Λ˜(d)f coming from the (d, k1, q1) ensemble of Construction-
A lattices. As mentioned earlier, Λ˜(d)f contains Zd as a sublattice. If the generator matrix of Λ˜
(d)
f has
full rank, then the number of cosets of Zd in Λ˜(d)f is q
k1
1 .
(f2) The lattice Λ˜(d)f is subjected to a linear transformation by the matrix (A(d))T , to get Λ(d) = (A(d))T Λ˜
(d)
f :=
{(A(d))Ty : y ∈ Λ˜(d)f } .
We will call this ensemble of (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) pairs as the (d, k, q, k1, q1) ensemble. The lattice pair can be
scaled appropriately so as to satisfy the average power constraint. We have M (d) = |Λ(d)/Λ(d)0 | = qk11
with probability tending to 1 as d− k tends to ∞ [25]. Hence, the rate of the (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) code will be
R(d) = k1
d
log2(q1). (25)
We choose
k = β0d, and k1 = β1d, (26)
for some 0 < β0, β1 < 1/2, and q and q1 are prime numbers chosen such that
lim
d→∞
d
q1
= 0, and r(0)min < reff(Λ
(d)
0 ) < 2r
(0)
min, (27)
for some 0 < r(0)min < 1/4. It is possible to choose primes that satisfy the above conditions, and we direct the
interested reader to [14] for the details. We then have the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix D.
Lemma 13. Let (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) be a nested lattice pair chosen uniformly at random from the (d, k, q, k1, q1)
ensemble, with the parameters k, q, k1, q1 chosen so as to satisfy (26) and (27). Then, the probability that
(Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) satisfies (G1)–(G3) tends to one as d approaches infinity.
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: Λ0 : Λ1
: Λ2 : Λ3
: Λ4
λ1
λ2
λ0
λ4
λ3
Fig. 11. Different cosets of Λ0 in Λ. The coset representative of Λj within V(Λ0) is λj .
C. Achievable Rates
We now find achievable transmission rates for reliable and secure computation of X ⊕Y at the relay. The
analysis closely follows that in [13], [25], [26]. As defined in Section VI-A, let D(W) be the estimate of X⊕Y
made by the relay; to be precise, D(W) is the coset of Λ(d)0 to which QΛ(d)(W) belongs. This is the same
as the coset represented by QΛ(d)([W] mod Λ
(d)
0 ).
Each lattice point in Λ(d)∩V(Λ(d)0 ) is a coset representative for a coset of Λ(d)0 in Λ(d). This is illustrated in
Fig. 11. Suppose that Λj and Λk are the cosets which represent the messages X and Y , respectively. Let X =
[U] mod Λ(d)0 and Y = [V] mod Λ
(d)
0 be the coset representatives of Λj and Λk, respectively. Then, Λj ⊕Λk
has [X + Y] mod Λ(d)0 as its representative. Therefore, the estimate D(W) has Ŵ = [QΛ(d)(W)] mod Λ(d)0
as its coset representative. This is equal to Ŵ = [QΛ(d)([W] mod Λ
(d)
0 )] mod Λ
(d)
0 . Let W˜ = [W] mod Λ
(d)
0 .
Then, Ŵ = [QΛ(d)(W˜)] mod Λ
(d)
0 . As a consequence of the transmitter-receiver operations, the “effective”
channel from X,Y to W˜ can be written as follows [25]:
W˜ = [U + V + Z] mod Λ(d)0
=
[(
[U + V] mod Λ(d)0
)
+ Z
]
mod Λ(d)0
=
[(
[X + Y] mod Λ(d)0
)
+ Z
]
mod Λ(d)0 .
A channel of the form W = [X + N] mod Λ(d)0 , where N denotes the noise vector, is called a Λ
(d)
0 -modulo
lattice additive noise (Λ(d)0 -MLAN) channel [13]. The random variable W˜ behaves like the output of a point-
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wˆ[·] mod Λ0 [QΛ(·)] mod Λ0[x + y] mod Λ0 w˜+
Fig. 12. MAC phase of the bidirectional relay and equivalent MLAN channel representation.
to-point transmission over a Λ(d)0 -MLAN channel, with the transmitted vector being [X + Y] mod Λ
(d)
0 .
Looking from W˜, the “effective” channel is a Λ(d)0 -MLAN channel, and the relay has to decode [X+Y] mod
Λ(d)0 reliably from W˜. This is illustrated in Fig. 12. We will use the properties of the Λ
(d)
0 -MLAN channel
to determine achievable rate regions for our coding scheme.
We choose a sequence of nested lattice pairs that satisfy (G1)–(G3), with each nested lattice pair coming
from a (d, k, q, k1, q1) ensemble, where k, q, k1 and q1 satisfy (26) and (27). Using the coding scheme of Sec-
tion VI-A, we can achieve perfect secrecy. The proposition below provides us with the means of determining
the rates achievable with this coding scheme.
Proposition 14. Let M > 0 be a constant, and {Λ(d),Λ(d)0 } be a sequence of nested lattice pairs that satisfy
(G1)–(G3), and scaled so as to satisfy reff(Λ(d)0 ) =
√
dM. Then, using the coding scheme of Section VI-A with
this sequence of nested lattice pairs, any rate less than 12 log2
( M
σ2
)
is achievable with perfect secrecy.
The proposition can be proved along the same lines as [13, Theorem 4]; we omit the details.
D. Relating Achievable Rates to Transmit Power
From (23), we know that as long as the average transmit power per dimension is less than
(
d/rpack
2(Λˆ(d)0 )
)
(1+
od(1)), we can guarantee perfect secrecy at the relay. From Proposition 14, we see that as long as the
transmission rate is less than 12 log2(reff2(Λ
(d)
0 )/(dσ2)), the relay can reliably compute X ⊕ Y from W. In
order to achieve positive rates, we need reff(Λ(d)0 ) to grow at least as fast as
√
d, i.e., reff(Λ(d)0 ) = Ω(
√
d).
Furthermore, to satisfy an average power constraint, we require rpack(Λˆ(d)0 ) = Ω(
√
d). The rate is an
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increasing function of reff(Λ(d)0 ), and the average transmit power per dimension is a decreasing function of
rpack(Λˆ(d)0 ). Since we want to maximize the rate for a given power constraint, we would like both reff(Λ
(d)
0 )
and rpack(Λˆ(d)0 ) to be as large as possible. However, for any lattice Λ
(d)
0 , we have rcov(Λ
(d)
0 )rpack(Λˆ
(d)
0 ) ≤ pid [3,
Theorem 18.3], and since reff(Λ(d)0 ) ≤ rcov(Λ(d)0 ), we get reff(Λ(d)0 )rpack(Λˆ(d)0 ) ≤ pid. Hence, to obtain positive
rates and at the same time satisfy the power constraint, both reff(Λ(d)0 ) and rpack(Λˆ
(d)
0 ) must grow roughly as√
d. Therefore, we seek lattices satisfying properties (G1)–(G3), for which the product reff(Λ(d)0 )rpack(Λˆ
(d)
0 )
is close to the upper bound of pid.
For a sequence of Construction-A coarse lattices satisfying (G1) and (G2), we can find an asymptotic
lower bound for (1/d)reff(Λ(d)0 )rpack(Λˆ
(d)
0 ),7 as the following theorem shows.
Lemma 15. Let {Λ(d)0 } be a sequence of coarse lattices, with each Λ(d)0 chosen from a (d, k, q) ensemble and
k, q satisfying (26) and (27). If {Λ(d)0 } satisfies conditions (G1)–(G2), then,
lim
d→∞
reff(Λ(d)0 )rpack(Λˆ
(d)
0 )
d
≥ 12e . (28)
Proof: See Appendix E.
E. Proof of Theorem 1
Let us choose reff(Λ(d)0 ) = 12e
√
dP, for a constant P > 4e2σ2. Fix a δ > 0. Using Lemma 15, we see that
rpack(Λˆ(d)0 ) ≥
d
2ereff(Λ(d)0 )
(1− od(1)) ≥
√
d√P (1− od(1)). (29)
From (23), we see that perfect secrecy can be achieved with an average power constraint as low as P (d) =(
d/rpack
2(Λˆ(d)0 )
)
(1 + od(1)). Combining this and (29), perfect secrecy can be achieved with an average
transmission power,
P (d) < P + δ (30)
for all sufficiently large d. From Proposition 14, we have seen that the average probability of error can be
made to go down to zero as long as
R(d) < R := 12 log2
P
(2e)2σ2 . (31)
Therefore, for every δ > 0, we can choose a sequence of nested lattice codes such that for all sufficiently
large d, we have R(d) > R− δ, P (d) < P + δ and η(d) < δ. Hence, a power-rate pair of(
P,
[
1
2 log2
P
σ2
− log2 2e
]+)
is achievable with perfect secrecy, concluding the proof of Theorem 1.
7The product reff(Λ(d)0 )rpack(Λˆ
(d)
0 ) is invariant to scaling of Λ
(d)
0 . This is because, for a constant α > 0, reff(αΛ
(d)
0 ) =
αreff(Λ(d)0 ), and if Λ′ = αΛ
(d)
0 , then the Fourier dual of Λ′ is (1/α)Λˆ
(d)
0 .
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VII. Strong Secrecy
A natural question that arises is what happens if we replace f in Theorem 10 by a density function for which
the support of the characteristic function goes beyond V(Λˆ(d)0 ). Can we obtain different secrecy properties by
simply changing the density f? Specifically, let ψ(t) be a characteristic function which is supported within a
ball of radius ρ > rpack(Λˆ(d)0 ), and choose the characteristic function φU |X=x(t) =
∑
n∈Λˆ(d)0
ψ(t + n)e−i〈n,x〉.
Clearly, we cannot expect perfect secrecy, but can we at least obtain strong secrecy? Let us take ψ to be the
characteristic function of the minimum-variance distribution in (21), with the support of ψ chosen to be a ball
of radius ρ = min{reff(Λˆ(d)0 ), 2rpack(Λˆ(d)0 )}.8 Doing so would give us an improved rate of
[ 1
2 log2
P
σ2 − log2 e
]+.
However, for such a coding scheme, we are only able to show that the `2 norm of the difference between
pU+V,X and pU+V pX goes to zero as d → ∞. Knowing only that the `2 norm of the difference between
pU+V,X and pU+V pX goes to zero as d → ∞, we cannot conclude whether strong secrecy is obtained. In
fact, by itself, the `2 norm is not a good measure of secrecy. In any case, we will use a different approach to
obtaining strong secrecy, and show that an even higher transmission rate of
[ 1
2 log2
( 1
2 +
P
σ2
)− 12 log2 2e]+
is achievable.
Instead of using distributions with compactly supported characteristic functions, we will use a sampled
Gaussian density for randomization at the encoders. Such a scheme was used in context of the wiretap
channel in [22]. We will show that if a Gaussian pdf is used instead of a density f having a compactly
supported characteristic function, then we can obtain strong secrecy. It is interesting to note that the same
basic coding scheme, but with a different pdf used for randomization, can give different secrecy properties.
A. The Gaussian Density
We now introduce some notation that will be used in the sequel. Let Λ be a lattice in Rd. For any x ∈ Rd,
and any κ > 0, we define gκ,x(·) to be the Gaussian density with mean x and covariance matrix κ2Id, i.e.,
∀z ∈ Rd,
gκ,x(z) :=
1
(2piκ2)d/2 e
− ‖z−x‖22κ2 . (32)
We also define
gκ,x(Λ) :=
∑
λ∈Λ
gκ,x(λ). (33)
We will use gκ(z) and gκ(Λ) to denote gκ,0(z) and gκ,0(Λ), respectively.
B. Coding Scheme for Strong Secrecy
Code: Following Section VI-A, we use a (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) nested lattice code, with Λ
(d)
0 ⊆ Λ(d). As before, the
messages are chosen from G(d) := Λ(d)/Λ(d)0 , and ⊕ is the addition operation on G(d). The M (d) := |G(d)|
cosets of Λ(d)0 in Λ(d) are denoted by Λ0, . . . ,ΛM(d)−1.
8If we have ρ > 2rpack(Λˆ(d)0 ), then
∑
n∈Λˆ(d)0
ψ(t+n)e−i〈n,x〉 would have to be normalized to make it a characteristic function,
and this makes analysis more complicated.
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Encoding: For a coset Λj of Λ(d)0 in Λ(d), let λj denote its representative within V(Λ(d)0 ) (see Fig. 11 for an
illustration). Fix a κ > 0. Corresponding to the message Λj , the user node transmits a random lattice point
from Λj , according to the distribution
pj(u) =

gκ(u)
gκ,−λj (Λ
(d)
0 )
if u ∈ Λj ,
0 otherwise.
(34)
Decoding: The relay computes the closest point in Λ(d) to the linear minimum mean-squared error (MMSE)
estimate of the received vector, as in [22], [13], [25], and the output of the decoder is the coset to which this
point belongs. Let α∗ = 2κ22κ2+σ2 be the linear MMSE coefficient, and W˜ = [α∗W] mod Λ
(d)
0 . The estimate
of X ⊕ Y , denoted by D(W), is then the coset to which QΛ(d)(W˜) belongs.
Achievable power-rate pair: A power-rate pair of (P,R) is achievable if for every δ > 0, there exists a
sequence of (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) nested lattice codes such that for all sufficiently large d,
• the average transmit power per dimension is less than P + δ:
P (d) := 1
d
E‖U‖2 = 1
d
E‖V‖2 < P + δ;
• the transmission rate is greater than R− δ:
R(d) := 1
d
log2M (d) > R− δ;
• the average probability of decoding X ⊕ Y incorrectly from W is less than δ; and
• the mutual information between each message and U + V is less than δ:
I(X; U + V) = I(Y ; U + V) < δ.
In the next two subsections, we will prove that
Theorem 16. A power-rate pair of(
P,
[
1
2 log2
(
1
2 +
P
σ2
)
− 12 log2 2e
]+)
can be achieved with strong secrecy using the coding scheme of Section VII-B.
C. Strong Secrecy in the Absence of Noise
We will first prove that the scheme described in the previous section achieves strong secrecy. Let us
establish some more notation. Let pU+V (·) denote the distribution of U +V , and for any x ∈ Λ(d)∩V(Λ(d)0 ),
let pU+V |x(·) denote the distribution of U + V conditioned on the event that X is the coset to which x
belongs. We will show that for every x in Λ(d) ∩ V(Λ(d)0 ) the variational distance (also called the total
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variation distance) between pU+V and pU+V |x(·), defined as9
V(pU+V , pU+V |x) :=
∑
w∈Λ(d)
|pU+V (w)− pU+V |x(w)|, (35)
goes to zero exponentially in the dimension d. Therefore, the average variational distance between the joint
pmf of U + V and X, and the product of the marginals,
V :=
∑
x∈Λ(d)∩V(Λ(d)0 )
1
|G(d)|V(pU+V , pU+V |x),
also goes to zero exponentially in d. We can then use the following lemma, which relates the mutual
information and the variational distance.
Lemma 17 ([9], Lemma 1). For |G(d)| ≥ 4, we have
I(X; U + V) ≤ V
(
log2 |G(d)| − log2(V)
)
. (36)
Since |G(d)| grows exponentially in d, it is sufficient to have V going to zero as o(1/d) for I(X; U + V) to
go to zero. We will in fact show that V can be made to go to zero exponentially in d, which will guarantee
that the mutual information also decays exponentially in d. In order to have V going to zero exponentially
in d, we will require the coarse and fine lattices to satisfy certain properties.
For any lattice Λ in Rd, and any θ > 0, the flatness factor Λ(θ) is defined as [22], [5]
Λ(θ) :=
maxx∈V(Λ) |
(∑
λ∈Λ gθ,λ(x)
)− (1/detΛ)|
1/detΛ . (37)
A useful property of the flatness factor is that it is a monotonic function of θ: for a > b > 0, and any
lattice Λ, we have Λ(a) ≤ Λ(b) [22, Remark 2]. Following [22], we define a sequence of lattices {Λ(d)} to
be secrecy-good if
Λ(d)(θ) ≤ 2−Ω(d) for all θ such that
(det(Λ(d)))2/d
2piθ2 < 1.
It was shown in [22] that there exist lattices that are secrecy-good and also satisfy all the goodness properties
described in Appendix C.
Let us choose κ in (34) to be equal to
√P. We can bound the variational distance in terms of the flatness
factor of the coarse lattice as follows:
Theorem 18. If the sequence of nested lattice pairs {Λ(d),Λ(d)0 } satisfies (d) := Λ(d)0 (
√P/2) < 1/2, then
for every x ∈ Λ(d) ∩ V(Λ(d)0 ), we have
V(pU+V , pU+V |x) ≤ 216(d). (38)
9For probability measures P1 and P2 defined on a discrete alphabet X , the total variation distance between them is usually
defined as V(P1, P2) := supA⊆X |P1(A) − P2(A)|. This can be shown to be equal to 12
∑
x∈X |P1(x) − P2(x)| (see e.g., [7,
Section 11.6]). We have dropped the 12 factor for simplicity.
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A proof of the above theorem is given in Appendix F. The constant 216 in the above theorem can be
improved, but we do not attempt to do so, as the exact constant is not important for our purposes.
The following result from [22, Section V-B] tells us that if the flatness factor of the coarse lattice goes to
zero as d→∞, then the average transmit power converges to P.
Lemma 19. If the flatness factor 1 := Λ(d)0
(
P√1− 1/(epi)) < 1/2, then,∣∣E‖U‖2 − dP∣∣ = ∣∣E‖V‖2 − dP∣∣ ≤ 2pi11− 1P.
Since
√
1− 1/(epi) > 1/√2, it is sufficient to have (by monotonicity of the flatness factor) Λ(d)0 (
√P/2)→ 0
to satisfy the power constraint for all sufficiently large d. From Theorem 18 and Lemma 17, we see that
strong secrecy can be obtained in the noiseless scenario.
D. Strong Secrecy and Reliability of Decoding in the Presence of AWGN
Since the noise Z is independent of everything else, we have strong secrecy in a noisy channel as well.
To see why this is the case, observe that X → (U + V) → (U + V + Z) forms a Markov chain. Using the
data-processing inequality, we see that I(X; U + V + Z) ≤ I(X; U + V), verifying our claim. Note that the
claim holds regardless of the probability distribution of the noise Z. The fact that the noise is Gaussian will
be used to determine achievable rates for reliable decoding of X ⊕ Y at the relay.
We choose our sequence of nested lattices {Λ(d),Λ(d)0 } so as to satisfy the following properties:
(L1) The sequence of coarse lattices, {Λ(d)0 }, is good for covering, MSE quantization, and AWGN channel
coding10.
(L2) The sequence of coarse lattices, {Λ(d)0 }, is secrecy-good.
(L3) The sequence of fine lattices, {Λ(d)}, is good for AWGN channel coding.
Using (44) in [22, Appendix II] and [22, Proposition 2], we can show that if Λ0 is a lattice sampled uniformly
at random from a (d, k, q) ensemble, where d, k, q satisfy (26) and (27), then for all sufficiently large d, we
have E[Λ0(θ)] ≤ 2
(
(det(Λ0))2/d
2piθ2
)d/2
, which goes to zero exponentially in d as long as (det(Λ0))
2/d
2piθ2 < 1. Using
the Markov inequality, we can say that the probability of choosing a lattice whose flatness factor is less
than 4
(
(det(Λ0))2/d
2piθ2
)d/2
is at least 1/2 for all sufficiently large d. From Lemma 13, we know that a randomly
chosen nested lattice pair satisfies (L1) and (L3) with probability tending to 1 as d→∞. We can then use
the union bound to conclude that a randomly chosen pair of nested lattices from the (d, k, q, k1, q1) ensemble
satisfies (L1)–(L3) with probability at least 1/2 as d→∞.
10For the definitions of lattices good for covering, MSE quantization, and AWGN channel coding, see Appendix C.
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We now work towards an estimate of the probability of error of decoding X ⊕Y from W. Recall that the
relay computes W˜ = [α∗W] mod Λ(d)0 , where α∗ = 2P2P+σ2 , and the estimate of X ⊕ Y is the coset to which
QΛ(d)(W˜) belongs. The quantity W˜ can be written as
W˜ = [α∗(U + V + Z)] mod Λ(d)0
= [U + V− (1− α∗)(U + V) + α∗Z] mod Λ(d)0
=
[
[X + Y] mod Λ(d)0 + Z′
]
mod Λ(d)0 , (39)
where Z′ = (α∗−1)(U+V)+α∗Z is the effective noise of the MLAN channel. Unlike in Section VI-C, Z′ is not
statistically independent of [X+Y] mod Λ(d)0 . However, as shown by the following lemma, if the flatness factor
of the coarse lattice is small, then the effective noise behaves like an almost independent Gaussian vector.
Let fZ′|x,y denote the density function of Z′ conditioned on X = x and Y = y, and fN denote the density
function of a Gaussian random vector, N, with mean 0 and covariance matrix
(
2(1− α∗)2P + (α∗)2σ2)Id.
Given two density functions f1 and f2 over Rd, the variational distance between f1 and f2, denoted by
V(f1, f2), is defined as
V(f1, f2) :=
∫
x∈Rd
|f1(x)− f2(x)| dx.
Then, we have the following lemma proved in Appendix G.
Lemma 20. If Λ(d)0 (
√
α∗P) < 1/2, then for every x and y in G(d),
V(fZ′|x,y, fN) ≤ 8Λ(d)0 (
√
α∗P).
1) Proof of Theorem 16: If P1 and P2 are probability measures on Rd having densities f1 and f2 respec-
tively, then supA⊂Rd |P1(A)−P2(A)| = 12V(f1, f2), where the supremum is taken over all measurable subsets
of Rd (assuming that both P1 and P2 are defined on a common event space) [11, Section 7.7]. Using this
and Lemma 20, the probability of error of the decoder can be bounded by
η(d) ≤ Pr
[
Z′ /∈ V(Λ(d))
]
≤ Pr
[
N /∈ V(Λ(d))
]
+ 4Λ(d)0 (
√
α∗P). (40)
The variance of N is equal to σ2N = 2(1−α∗)2P + (α∗)2σ2 = 2Pσ
2
2P+σ2 . If the flatness factor Λ(d)0 (
√
α∗P)→ 0
as d → ∞, and the fine lattices are good for AWGN channel coding, then the probability of error at the
relay goes to zero as long as (det(Λ
(d)))2/d
2pieσ2
N
> 1, or equivalently,
1
|G(d)|2/d
(det(Λ(d)0 ))2/d
2pieσ2N
> 1.
In other words,
R(d) = 1
d
log2 |G(d)| <
1
2 log2
(
(det(Λ(d)0 ))2/d
2pieσ2N
)
. (41)
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If we have α∗ ≥ 1/2, then by monotonicity of the flatness factor, Λ(d)0 (
√
α∗P) ≤ Λ(d)0 (
√P/2). This requires
2P
2P+σ2 ≥ 1/2, or P ≥ σ2/2. Observe that having Λ(d)0 (
√P/2) → 0 has three important consequences: (a)
strong secrecy, even in the absence of noise (Theorem 18); (b) the average transmit power converges to P
(Lemma 19); and (c) the effective noise vector is “almost” independent of the message (Lemma 20).
Using (L2), in order to have the flatness factor Λ(d)0 (
√P/2) → 0, the coarse lattices must be scaled so
that (
det(Λ(d)0 )
)2/d
2pi(P/2) < 1. (42)
Let us choose
(
det(Λ(d)0 )
)2/d
= piP − δ, for some arbitrary δ > 0, so as to satisfy (42). Substituting this in
(41), we get that for P ≥ σ2/2, as long as
R(d) <
1
2 log2
(P − δ/pi
2eσ2N
)
,
the probability of error of decoding X ⊕ Y at the relay, as well as the mutual information between the
individual messages and W, go to zero as d→∞. Substituting for σ2N , we complete the proof of Theorem 16.
Remark 21. In the perfect secrecy setting, we were not able to show that the technique of MMSE scaling
can be used to obtain an additional 1/2 in the rate expression. As in the strong-secrecy case, suppose that the
relay computes W˜ := [α∗W] mod Λ(d)0 , where α∗ := (2P)/(2P+σ2). The effective noise vector, Zeff = −(1−
α∗)(U+V)+α∗Z is not Gaussian, since U and V are not Gaussian. In order to find the probability of decoding
error, we require an upper bound on the probability that Zeff /∈ V(Λ(d)), which is not straightforward unlike in
the Gaussian case. Consequently, we were not able to say whether lattice decoding achieves vanishingly small
error probabilities in this situation.
E. Prior Work on Strong Secrecy
The strongly secure scheme proposed by He and Yener in [19] also used nested lattice codes as we have
done here. They obtain strong secrecy using universal hash functions, and show the existence of a suitable
linear hash function that ensures that the mutual information decays exponentially in d. Unlike [19], we
have used a sampled Gaussian pmf for randomization at the encoder, and hence, for a given pair of nested
lattices, we explicitly specify the distribution used for randomization. Even using our scheme, the mutual
information goes down to zero exponentially in d. But unlike [19], which was valid under a maximum power
constraint at each node, the codebook we use is unbounded, so our scheme can only satisfy an average power
constraint. Also, the achievable rate in the scheme of He and Yener is slightly higher (by 12 log2
e
2 bits per
channel use). On the other hand, the He-Yener randomization scheme uses hash functions whose existence
is only guaranteed by a probabilistic argument, while our randomization scheme has the advantage of being
specified by sampled Gaussian pmfs that can be given in explicit form. The scheme in [19] was coupled with
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S R2R1 RK D
Fig. 13. Multi-hop line network with K + 1 hops.
an Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) code [8] for Byzantine detection, and it was shown that the
probability of a Byzantine attack being undetected could be made to decay to zero exponentially in d. We
remark that our coding scheme can also be extended to this scenario, where it can be used as a replacement
for the nested lattice code in [19].
VIII. Multi-hop Line Network
The bidirectional relay can be viewed as a building block in many wireless networks. In particular, the
problem of secure compute-and-forward can be extended to scenarios where we want secure relaying of
messages from one point to another on a network with multiple honest-but-curious relays. As an example,
we will extend our results to the multi-hop line network studied in [18]. The structure of a multi-hop line
network with K + 1 hops is shown in Fig. 13. It consists of K + 2 nodes: a source node, S, a destination
node, D, and K relay nodes, R1, R2, . . . , RK . It is assumed that all links are identical AWGN (mean zero,
variance σ2) wireless links. All nodes are half-duplex and can communicate only with their neighbours. Nodes
broadcast their messages to their immediate neighbours.
The source wants to send N messages, X1, X2, . . . , XN , to the destination across the network of honest-
but-curious relays. The messages are assumed to be independent and uniformly distributed over the set of
all messages. It is assumed that the relays do not co-operate with each other, i.e., the information available
at a relay is not shared with the other relays. As remarked by He and Yener in [18], this also takes care of
the situation wherein the eavesdropper has access to one of the relays, but it is not known which relay has
been compromised. We study this problem mainly under the strong secrecy constraint, but the arguments
can be extended to the perfect secrecy scenario.
He and Yener showed that their scheme [18] achieves weak secrecy over the multi-hop line network, but
their arguments cannot be directly extended for strong secrecy. We give a new proof that shows that our
strongly secure scheme for the bidirectional relay can be used with the He and Yener co-operative jamming
protocol to obtain strong secrecy in a multi-hop line network.11
1) The Communication Scheme: We use the co-operative jamming scheme proposed by He and Yener for
relaying. The communication takes place in 2N+K phases, where each phase consists of d channel uses. Let
us choose a sequence of (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) nested lattice pairs that satisfy properties (L1)–(L3). Each node in the
network employs the encoding and decoding scheme described in Section VII-B. Let D : Rd → G(d) denote
11In fact, our proof shows that any strongly secure coding scheme for the bidirectional relay can be used to obtain strong
secrecy in the multihop network. However, the achievable rate would depend on the coding scheme.
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the decoder map of Section VII-B. Also, for any X ∈ G(d), let E(X) denote the encoded form of X as in
Section VII-B.
• Each relay node i (i = 1, . . . ,K) generates a jamming signal, Ji, which is chosen uniformly at random
from G(d), and independently of everything else. The destination generates N independent jamming
signals, JK+l, for l = 1, 2, . . . , N , where N is the number of messages to be relayed.
• Let Wi[n] denote the d-dimensional vector received by the ith node in the nth phase, and let Vi[n] be
the vector transmitted by the ith node in the nth phase.
An average power constraint is imposed at the nodes: 1dE‖Vi[n]‖2 ≤ P (d) for i = 0, 1, . . . ,K + 1 and
n = 1, 2, . . . ,K + 2N .
Since it takes K + 2N phases for sending N messages, the rate of the scheme is defined as
R
(d)
N :=
N
d(K + 2N) log2 |G
(d)|. (43)
We say that a power-rate pair of (P,R) is achievable for N -message transmission with strong secrecy in a
multi-hop line network with K + 1 hops, if for every δ > 0, there exists a sequence of (Λ(d),Λ(d)0 ) nested
lattice codes such that for all sufficiently large d, we have
• P (d) < P + δ;
• R(d)N > R− δ;
• the probability of the destination decoding X1, X2, . . . , XN incorrectly, η(d), is less than δ; and,
• for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, the mutual information between the N messages and all the variables available at
the kth relay is less than δ, i.e.,
I(X1, . . . , XN ; Jk,Wk[1], . . . ,Wk[2N +K]) < δ.
We will describe the scheme for secure message relaying in the next subsection, and find achievable power-rate
pairs. As the main result, letting the number of messages to go to infinity, we will show the following:
Theorem 22. A power-rate pair of(
P,
[
1
4 log2
(
1
2 +
P
σ2
)
− 14 log2 2e
]+)
is achievable with strong secrecy12, and a power-rate pair of(
P,
[
1
4 log2
( P
σ2
)
− 12 log2 2e
]+)
is achievable with perfect secrecy at the relay nodes in a multi-hop line network with K + 1 hops.
12If the scheme in [19] is used at each node, then the achievable rate with strong secrecy can be improved to[
1
4 log2
(
1
2 +
P
σ2
)
− 12
]+.
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Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Phase 5
Phase 6
S
S
S
S
S
S
DR2R1
R1 R2 D
DR2R1
DR2R1
R1
R1
R2
R2
D
D
J1
X1 ⊕ J1
X1 ⊕ J2
X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J2
X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J3
J1
J2
X1 ⊕ J2
X1 ⊕ J3
X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J3
X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J4 X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J4
X1 ⊕ J4
X1 ⊕ J3
J3
J2
Fig. 14. Secure relaying of two messages in a 3-hop relay network.
Phase Messages available at node at the end of phase
S R1 R2 D
0 X1, X2 J1 J2 J3, J4
1 X1, X2, J1 J1 J1, J2 J3, J4
2 X1, X2, J1 J1, X1 ⊕ J2 J1, J2 J2, J3, J4
3 X1, X2, J1, J2 J1, X1 ⊕ J2 J1, J2, X1 ⊕ J3 J2, J3, J4
4 X1, X2, J1, J2 J1, X1 ⊕ J2, X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J3 J1, J2, X1 ⊕ J3 X1, J2, J3, J4
5 X1, X2, J1, J1, X1 ⊕ J2, J1, J2, X1 ⊕ J3, X1, J2, J3, J4
J2, J3 X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J3 X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J4
6 X1, X2, J1, J1, X1 ⊕ J2, X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J3, J1, J2, X1 ⊕ J3, X1, X2, J2,
J2, J3 X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J4 X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ J4 J3, J4
TABLE I
Messages available at various nodes at the end of each phase for the protocol in Fig. 14.
2) Scheme of He and Yener for Multi-Hop Relaying: We now describe the scheme for secure relaying. A
more detailed description can be found in [18]. The case where S wants to send two messages, X1 and X2, to
the destination is illustrated for a network with two relays in Fig. 14. Only the messages (elements of G(d))
transmitted by each node are indicated in the figure, and it is assumed that actual transmitted vectors are
the encoded versions of the messages indicated. The messages available at various nodes at the end of each
phase are tabulated in Table I. Let us use the notation ⊕tp=1Xp to denote X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xt.
• The ith node (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K + 1) transmits in the (2t+ i)th phase, for t = 0, 1, . . . , N .
• In the (2t+ i)th phase (t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N), the ith node sends
Vi[2t+ i] = E
(
(⊕tp=1Xp)⊕ Ji+t
)
. (44)
This holds for all nodes, i = 0, 1, . . . ,K + 1. The ith node evaluates (⊕tp=1Xp) ⊕ Ji+t by subtracting
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the message transmitted by it in the (2t+ i− 2)nd phase from the message decoded in the (2t+ i− 1)st
phase.
Since the destination knows JK+1, . . . , JK+N , it can compute ⊕tp=1Xp from E
(
(⊕tp=1Xp) ⊕ JK+t
)
, for
t = 0, 1, . . . N , and hence, each of the messages Xl.
3) Secrecy: Let us assume that all links are noiseless. As argued at the end of Section VII-C, it is enough
to show that strong secrecy is obtained in this situation. Let {Xp : p = 1, . . . , N} denote the set of i.i.d.
messages to be sent to the destination. Let us fix a k from {1, 2, . . . ,K}. In the (2t+ k− 1)st phase, the kth
relay receives
Wk[2t+ k − 1] = Vk−1[2t+ k − 1] + Vk+1[2t+ k − 1] (45)
= E
(
(⊕tp=1Xp)⊕ Jk+t−1
)
+ E
(
(⊕t−1p=1Xp)⊕ Jk+t
)
, (46)
for 1 ≤ t ≤ N , and Wk[k − 1] = E(Jk−1). For t = 1, 2, . . . , N , let us define
Θk,t := {Jk, Jk−1,Wk[2m+ k − 1] : 1 ≤ m ≤ t} (47)
to be the set of all random variables available at the kth relay at the end of the (2t+k−1)st phase. We also
define Θk,0 := {Jk, Jk−1}. Note that Θk,t−1 ⊂ Θk,t for t = 1, 2, . . . , N , and Θk,N is the set of all random
variables available at the kth relay at the end of all phases. We have to show that I(X1, . . . , XN ; Θk,N )→ 0
as d→∞.
Lemma 23. Let (d) := Λ(d)0 (
√P/2) < 1/2. Then, the total information available at the kth relay node at
the end of all relaying phases can be bounded from above as follows:
I(X1, . . . , XN ; Θk,N ) ≤ N(d)
(
log2 |G(d)| − log2 (d)
)
. (48)
Proof: See Appendix H.
Since for our choice of nested lattices, (d) → 0 exponentially in d, the mutual information I(X1, . . . , XN ; Θk,N )
also goes to zero exponentially in d, thereby guaranteeing strong secrecy.
4) Achievable Rate and Proof of Theorem 22: Using the union bound, one can show that for each N , the
probability of the kth relay being in error in the ith phase goes to zero as d → ∞ for all k and i. Using
Theorem 16, we can say that a power-rate pair of
(
P, N2(K+2N+1)
[
log2
( 1
2 +
P
σ2
)− log2 2e]+) is achievable
for the transmission of N messages using this scheme. Letting the number of messages, N , go to infinity, we
have the first part of Theorem 22. The second part of the theorem can be proved in a similar manner.
IX. Conclusion
We have described two coding schemes for secure bidirectional relaying in presence of an honest-but-curious
relay. We saw that using pmfs generated from density functions having compactly supported characteristic
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functions, one can obtain perfect secrecy. We showed that reliable and perfectly secure computation at the
relay is possible at transmission rates below
[ 1
2 log2
P
σ2 − log2 2e
]+. This is the first such result for perfect
secrecy in the context of the bidirectional relay. In order to achieve higher transmission rates, we relaxed
the secrecy constraint, and only required that the mutual information between U + V and each individual
message goes to zero for large block lengths. Using pmfs obtained from sampled Gaussian functions, we
could achieve a rate of
[ 1
2 log2
( 1
2 +
P
σ2
)− 12 log2 2e]+. Prior work by He and Yener showed that a rate of[ 1
2 log2
( 1
2 +
P
σ2
)− 1]+ is achievable with strong secrecy. These rates are within a constant gap of the best
known achievable rate of
[ 1
2 log2
( 1
2 +
P
σ2
)]+ without secrecy constraints [25], [36].
The main theme of this paper was the use of nested lattice codes, and explicit pmfs having infinite support
to obtain security. An inherent disadvantage of our scheme is that it is not possible to satisfy a maximum
power constraint. One could study the scenario where the support of the distributions we described are
truncated, and find the performance of such a scheme; we are yet to carry out this study.
All our results were derived under the assumptions that the messages are uniformly distributed, the channel
gains from the user nodes to the relay are equal, and transmissions from both users are synchronized to
arrive at the relay at the same time. Of course, in practice, these assumptions need not hold. Unfortunately,
perfect secrecy does not appear to be robust to deviations from these assumptions. Indeed, if X and Y are
not uniformly distributed, then we no longer have (X ⊕ Y ) ⊥ X and (X ⊕ Y ) ⊥ Y . In general, if the
channel gains are not equal and unknown at the user nodes, it is hard to get perfect secrecy. It can be shown
that if u,v ∈ Λ(d), and h1, h2 are real numbers such that h1/h2 is irrational, then it is possible to exactly
recover (u,v) from h1u+h2v. However, it may be possible to obtain strong secrecy even when some of these
assumptions do not hold, but this is left as future work. But it is worth noting that our scheme guarantees
perfect (strong) security even in the absence of noise, and hence it achieves perfect (strong) secrecy even
when the distribution of the additive noise is arbitrary and unknown, as long as it is independent of the
transmitted codewords.
The nested lattice coding schemes analyzed in this paper rely upon closest lattice point decoding, which
is known to be computationally hard in general. However, recall that our randomization scheme for perfect
secrecy works with any pair of nested lattices. In particular, it would work with nested lattice pairs on which
practical coding schemes can be based, where by “practical coding schemes” we mean explicitly constructed
nested lattice codes that admit reliable decoding with low computational complexity. Lattice coding schemes
with low-complexity decoders have been studied in the literature, e.g., [10], [15], [32], [33], [38]. Our scheme
for strong secrecy, on the other hand, requires that the nested lattices satisfy various goodness properties.
Further investigation is needed to determine whether all these goodness properties can be found in lattices
that admit low-complexity decoding.
Finally, in this paper, we only found achievable rates for secure and reliable computation at the relay. As
remarked in [19], finding a converse result is much harder. Even without any secrecy constraints, a nontrivial
outer bound on the capacity of a bidirectional relay is not known.
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Appendix A: Technical Details of Example 1
We show here that the function h(x) = (3pi2/4) [f(pix/4)]2, with f as in (15), is a density function whose
characteristic function is given by
ψ(t) = 32 g(
4t
pi ),
where g is as in (17).
Note first that fˆ defined in (16) is also a probability density function — it is non-negative and its integral
over (−∞,∞) is 1. By Fourier inversion, its characteristic function is 2pif . Therefore, g = fˆ ∗ fˆ is a density
with characteristic function 4pi2f2.
Now, f2 is integrable since (fˆ)2 is integrable (see corollary to Theorem 3 of Section XV.3 of [17]). Hence,
h˜(x) = f2(x)/(
∫∞
−∞ f
2(y) dy) is a probability density function. The integral in the denominator can be
explicitly evaluated by means of the Plancherel identity:∫ ∞
−∞
f2(y) dy = 12pi
∫ ∞
−∞
[fˆ(t)]2 dt = 12pi g(0) =
1
3pi ,
the last equality following from (17). Thus, h˜(x) = 3pif2(x).
From the fact that 4pi2f2 is the characteristic function of g, it follows by Fourier inversion that h˜ has
characteristic function given by ψ˜(t) = 32 g(t). Hence, h(x) = (pi/4)h˜(pix/4) is a density function with
characteristic function ψ˜(4t/pi), which is precisely ψ(t).
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 10
We are given an index-M sublattice Λ0 of the lattice Λ. Recall from Section II-A that (det Λ0)/(det Λ) =
M . Let Λ0,Λ1, . . . ,ΛM−1 denote the M cosets of Λ0 in Λ. These constitute the elements of the quotient
group G = Λ/Λ0.
Suppose that X,Y are iid random variables, each uniformly distributed over G. For each j ∈ {0, 1, . . .M−
1}, let pj be a pmf supported within the coset Λj , so that pj(k) = 0 for k /∈ Λj . We define a random variable
U (resp. V ) jointly distributed with X (resp. Y ) as follows: if X = Λj (resp. Y = Λj), U (resp. V ) is a
random point from Λj picked according to the distribution pj . Then, U and V are identically distributed
with pU = pV = 1M
∑M−1
i=0 pi. Let ϕU , ϕV and ϕj , j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, be the characteristic functions
corresponding to pU , pV and pj , j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, respectively. We have the following straightforward
generalization of Lemma 3.
Lemma 24. Suppose that ϕUϕV = ϕjϕV = ϕUϕj for j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1. Then, the random variables
(U, V,X, Y ) with joint pmf given by
pUVXY (k, l,Λi,Λj) = (1/M)(1/M)pi(k)pj(l)
for k, l ∈ Λ and Λi,Λj ∈ G (49)
have properties (S1)–(S3).
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We will now construct the characteristic functions ϕj that satisfy the above lemma. Let f be the (con-
tinuous) probability density function corresponding to the compactly supported characteristic function ψ in
the hypothesis of Theorem 10. The function f can be retrieved from ψ by Fourier inversion:
f(x) = 1(2pi)d
∫
Rd
ψ(t)e−i〈t,x〉 dt
= 1(2pi)d
∫
V(Λˆ0)
ψ(t)e−i〈t,x〉 dt. (50)
Note that each coset Λj can be expressed as uj + Λ0 for some uj ∈ Λ. We set
ϕj(ζ) =
∑
n∈Λˆ0
ψ(ζ + n) e−i〈n,uj〉 (51)
for all ζ ∈ Rd. Then, by Proposition 5, we have that pj is supported within Λj , and
pj(k) = (det Λ0) f(k) for all k ∈ Λj . (52)
Finally, define
ϕ(ζ) =
∑
n∈Λˆ
ψ(ζ + n) (53)
for all ζ ∈ Rd.
We make two claims:
(i) ϕ2 = ϕϕj for j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1;
(ii) ϕ = ϕU = ϕV .
Given these claims, by Lemma 24, the random variables U, V satisfy the properties (S1)–(S3).
Both claims follow from the fact that Λˆ is a sublattice of Λˆ0. (If a lattice Γ contains a sublattice Γ0, then
the dual Γ∗ is a sublattice of Γ∗0.) To see (i), we re-write (53) as
ϕ(ζ) =
∑
n∈Λˆ
ψ(ζ + n) e−i〈n,uj〉. (54)
This is possible because, for n ∈ Λˆ = 2piΛ∗ and uj ∈ Λ, we have e−i〈n,uj〉 = 1. Comparing (51) and (54),
and noting that ψ is supported within V(Λˆ0), it is evident that supp(ϕ) := {ζ : ϕ(ζ) 6= 0} is contained in
supp(ϕj) := {ζ : ϕj(ζ) 6= 0}. Furthermore, for all ζ ∈ supp(ϕ), we have ϕ(ζ) = ϕj(ζ). Claim (i) directly
follows from this.
For Claim (ii), we note that V(Λˆ0) ⊆ V(Λˆ), since Λˆ is a sublattice of Λˆ0. Hence, we can apply Proposition 5
to deduce that ϕ is the characteristic function of a pmf p supported within Λ, with
p(k) = (det Λ) f(k) for all k ∈ Λ.
Thus, from (52) and the fact that (det Λ0)/(det Λ) = M , we see that p = 1M
∑M−1
j=0 pj . In other words,
p = pU = pV , which proves Claim (ii).
It remains to prove the statements concerning finiteness of E‖U‖2 and E‖V ‖2. Theorem 1 in [37] shows
that these moments are finite iff ϕ is twice differentiable at 0 (i.e., all second-order partial derivatives exist at
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0). From (53), we see that ϕ agrees with ψ in a small neighbourhood around 0; hence, ϕ is twice differentiable
at 0 iff ψ is twice differentiable at 0.
Assuming that ψ has all second-order partial derivatives at 0, we must show that E‖U‖2 = E‖V ‖2 =
−∆ψ(0). Since U and V are identically distributed, it is enough to show that E‖U‖2 = −∆ψ(0). Write
U = (U1, . . . , Ud), so that ‖U‖2 = U21 + · · ·+U2d . We want to show that E[U2j ] = − ∂
2
∂t2
j
ψ(0), for j = 1, . . . , d.
For notational simplicity, we show this for j = 1. Note that the characteristic function of U1 is given by
ϕU1(t1) = ϕU (t1, 0, . . . , 0). As argued prior to the statement of Theorem 7 in Section V-C, E[U21 ] = −ϕ′′U1(0).
Now, ϕ′′U1(0) =
∂2
∂t21
ϕU (0, 0, . . . , 0). From (53), we have that ϕU = ψ in a small neighbourhood around
0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore, ∂2
∂t21
ϕU (0) = ∂
2
∂t21
ψ(0), and hence, E[U21 ] = − ∂
2
∂t21
ψ(0), as desired.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 10.
Appendix C: “Good” Lattice Properties
In this appendix, we briefly review certain “good” lattice properties, and some results in the literature.
This is almost entirely based on [14]. Let {Λ(d)} be a sequence of lattices, with each Λ(d) chosen uniformly
at random from a (d, k, q) ensemble described in Section VI-B.
We say that that the sequence of lattices {Λ(d)} is good for covering if
lim
d→∞
rcov(Λ(d))
reff(Λ(d))
= 1.
We say that {Λ(d)} is good for packing if
lim
d→∞
rpack(Λ(d))
reff(Λ(d))
≥12 .
Let GΛ(d) denote the normalized second moment per dimension of Λ(d), as defined in Section II-A. A sequence
of lattices {Λ(d)} is said to be good for MSE quantization if GΛ(d) → 12pie as d→∞.
Let Z be a zero-mean d-dimensional white Gaussian vector having second moment per dimension equal
to σ2. Let
µ :=
vol
(V(Λ(d)))2/d
σ2
.
Then we say that {Λ(d)} is good for AWGN channel coding if the probability that Z lies outside the
fundamental Voronoi region of Λ(d) is upper bounded by
Pr[Z /∈ V(Λ(d))] ≤ e−d
(
EU (µ)−od(1)
)
for all σ2 that satisfy µ ≥ 2pie. Here, EU (·), called the Poltyrev exponent is defined as follows:
EU (µ) =

µ
16pie if 8pie ≤ µ
1
2 ln
µ
8pi if 4pie ≤ µ ≤ 8pie
µ
4pie − 12 ln µ2pi if 2pie ≤ µ ≤ 4pie.
(55)
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Suppose that we use a subcollection of points from Λ(d) as the codebook for transmission over an AWGN
channel. Then, as long as
vol
(V(Λ(d)))2/d
σ2
≥ 2pie,
the probability that a lattice decoder decodes to a lattice point other than the one that was transmitted,
decays exponentially in the dimension d, with the exponent given by (55).
It is worth noting that the above “goodness” properties are invariant to scaling. If {Λ(d)} is a sequence
of lattices that is good for covering, packing, and AWGN channel coding, then for any α > 0, {αΛ(d)} is
also good for covering, packing and AWGN channel coding. This is because of the fact that rpack(αΛ(d)) =
αrpack(Λ(d)), rcov(αΛ(d)) = αrcov(Λ(d)), and reff(αΛ(d)) = αreff(Λ(d)).
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 13
In proving Lemma 13, we use the following theorem from [14], which says that if the parameters k and q
are selected appropriately, then almost all lattices in a (d, k, q) ensemble satisfy the “goodness” properties
described in Appendix C.
Theorem 25 ([14], Theorem 5). Let 0 < rmin < 14 be chosen arbitrarily. Let Λ(d) be a sequence of lattices
selected uniformly at random from a (d, k, q) ensemble, such that
• k ≤ β1d for some 0 < β1 < 1, but k grows faster than log2 d, and
• q is chosen so that reff(Λ(d)), as given by (24), satisfies rmin < reff(Λ(d)) < 2rmin.
Then, the sequence of lattices Λ(d) is simultaneously good for covering, packing and MSE quantization, with
probability approaching 1 as d tends to infinity. If, in addition, we have β1 < 1/2, then the sequence of lattices
is also simultaneously good for AWGN channel coding with probability tending to 1 as d→∞.
Therefore, if we choose k and q that satisfy the hypotheses of Lemma 13, then from the above theorem,
the probability that a uniformly chosen Λ(d)0 satisfies condition (G1) tends to 1 as d→∞.
Recall from Section II-A that if A is a generator matrix of a lattice Λ, then the dual lattice of Λ, denoted
by Λ∗, is the set of all integer linear combinations of the rows of A−1. It turns out that the dual of a
Construction-A lattice is also a Construction-A lattice, as seen from the following.
Proposition 26. Suppose that G is the k × d systematic generator matrix of a (d, k) linear code C over Zq,
q being prime, i.e., G has the form
G =
[
Ik B
]
,
where Ik denotes the k × k identity matrix. Let Λ(C) be the lattice obtained by employing Construction A on
the code C. Then, the matrix
A = 1
q
 Ik B
0 qI(d−k)
 (56)
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is a generator matrix for the lattice Λ(C).
Proof: We want to show that ATZd := {ATy : y ∈ Zd} = Λ(C). By definition, Λ(C) = {x ∈ Rd :
(qx) mod q ∈ C}. Fix any z ∈ Zd. Then, it can be verified that (qAT z) mod q = (GT zˆ) mod q (which is a
codeword in C) for some zˆ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}k. Therefore, (qAT z) mod q ∈ C, and hence, ATZd ⊆ Λ(C). For
the converse, define C′ = { 1qc : c ∈ C}. Then, Λ(C) = C′+Zd := {c+z : c ∈ C′, z ∈ Zd}. The set ATZd forms
a group under (componentwise) addition. Hence, it is sufficient to show that C′ ⊆ ATZd, and Zd ⊆ ATZd.
Fix an arbitrary c ∈ C. Let c′ = 1qc. By definition, there exists an x ∈ Zkq such that
c =
([
Ik B
]T
x
)
mod q
=
 x
BTx
− q
 0
z′
 (57)
for some z′ ∈ Zd−k. Therefore,
c =
 Ik B
0 qI(d−k)
T  x
−z′
 .
Hence, there exists
z =
 x
z′
 ∈ Zd
so that c′ = AT z. Therefore, we can say that C′ ⊆ ATZd. Next, consider z ∈ Zd. Let A∗ be defined as
A∗ =
 qIk 0
−BT I(d−k)
 , (58)
and note that ATA∗ = Id, the d×d identity matrix. Let z′ = A∗z ∈ Zd. Then, AT z′ = AT (A∗z) = (ATA∗)z =
z. Hence, we can say that for every z ∈ Zd, there exists a z′ ∈ Zd so that z = AT z′, and hence Zd ⊆ ATZd,
thus concluding the proof.
It can be shown in a similar manner that if G has the form
G =
[
B Ik
]
,
then,
A = 1
q
 B Ik
qI(d−k) 0

is a generator matrix for Λ(C).
It is easy to verify that if A is full rank, then A∗ defined in (58) is the inverse of A, and A∗ is a generator
matrix of Λ∗(C). Since a permutation of the rows of a generator matrix of a lattice also yields a valid
generator matrix for the same lattice,
A∗1 =
 −BT I(d−k)
qIk 0

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is also a generator matrix for Λ∗(C). If C⊥ denotes the dual code of C, then C⊥ has a generator matrix [30]
G =
[
−BT I(d−k)
]
.
We thus have the following result.
Lemma 27. Let C, G, Λ(C) be as in Proposition 26. Then, the dual of Λ(C), denoted by Λ∗(C), has generator
matrix
A∗ =
 qIk 0
−BT I(d−k)
 . (59)
Therefore, Λ∗(C) = qΛ(C⊥), where C⊥ denotes the dual code of C.
Since Λ∗(C) = qΛ(C⊥), if the generator matrix is full-rank, then Λ(C⊥) belongs to a (d, d−k, q) ensemble.
Therefore, from [14], we can say that a randomly picked Λ(C⊥) is good for packing and covering with
probability tending to 1 as d→∞, as long as d− k ≤ β1d for some 0 < β1 < 1, and d− k grows faster than
log2 d. From the definitions, we see that the properties of covering and packing goodness are invariant to any
scaling of the lattices. Therefore, if Λ(C⊥) is good for packing and covering, then qΛ(C⊥), and hence Λ∗(C) is
also good for packing and covering. We have seen that the probability of {Λ(d)0 } being simultaneously good
for covering, packing and AWGN channel coding tends to 1 as d tends to ∞. If we choose k = β1d for some
β1 < 1/2, then the sequence of dual lattices is good for packing with probability tending to 1 as d → ∞.
Using the union bound, we can argue that a randomly picked sequence of coarse lattices satisfies (G1) and
(G2) with probability going to 1 as d→∞. .
It was also shown in [13] that if the coarse lattices are good for covering and AWGN channel coding, then
as long as d/q1 → 0 as d→∞, the probability that a uniformly chosen sequence of fine lattices is good for
AWGN channel coding tends to 1 as d→∞. This completes the proof of Lemma 13.
Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 15
For ease of notation, denote by reff , the effective radius of Λ(d)0 . The index, d, in reff has been dropped
but it must be understood that this is a function of d. Let C(d) denote the (d, k) code over Zq that is used
to generate the coarse lattice. Using (24),
qk = Γ(d/2 + 1)
pid/2reffd
=
√
dpi
(
d
2piereff2
)d/2
(1 + od(1)), (60)
where the second step uses Stirling’s approximation, and od(1) is a term that approaches 0 as d→∞. From
(26), k = β0d for some 0 < β0 < 1/2. Substituting this in the above, and raising both sides to the power
1/d, we get
qβ0 = (dpi) 12d
(
d
2piereff2
)1/2
(1 + od(1))1/d = (dpi)
1
2d
√
d√
2piereff
(1 + od(1)). (61)
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Let Λ(d)∗0 denote the dual of Λ
(d)
0 , and reff∗ denote the effective radius of Λ
(d)∗
0 . Let Λ0(C(d)⊥) be the
lattice obtained by applying Construction-A on the dual of C(d), i.e., on C(d)⊥. As remarked in Appendix D,
Λ0(C(d)⊥) comes from a (d, d−k, q) ensemble. From Lemma 27, Λ(d)∗0 = qΛ0(C(d)⊥). Therefore, (1/q)Λ(d)∗0 =
Λ0(C(d)⊥) will satisfy
qd−k =
√
dpi
 d
2pie
(
reff( 1qΛ
(d)∗
0 )
)2

d/2
(1 + od(1)),
where od(1)→ 0 as d→∞. But reff( 1qΛ(d)∗0 ) = 1q reff∗, and hence, analogous to (61), we have
qd(1−β0) =
√
dpi
(
d
2pie(1/q)2(reff∗)2
)d/2
(1 + od(1)). (62)
Rearranging,
reff
∗ = (dpi) 12d
√
dqβ0√
2pie
(1 + od(1))1/d. (63)
Let the packing radius of Λ(d)∗0 be rpack(Λ
(d)∗
0 ) = γ(d)reff∗. From the definition of the packing radius,
γ(d) ≤ 1 for all d. Again, since the dual lattice is good for packing, limd→∞ γ(d) ≥ 1/2. Also, since od(1)→ 0
as d→∞, we have (1 + od(1))1/d = (1 + od(1)). Therefore, we have,
reff(Λ(d)0 )rpack(Λ
(d)∗
0 ) = γ(d)reff(Λ
(d)
0 )(dpi)(1/2d)
√
dqβ0√
2pie
(1 + od(1)).
Substituting for qβ0 from (61) in the above equation, we get
reff(Λ(d)0 )rpack(Λ
(d)∗
0 )
d
= γ(d)(dpi)(1/d) 12pie (1 + od(1)). (64)
Therefore, as d → ∞, the above expression converges to a value greater than or equal to 1/4pie. Using
rpack(Λˆ(d)0 ) = 2pirpack(Λ
(d)∗
0 ), we get Lemma 15.
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 18
The following lemma from [22] will be used in the proof.
Lemma 28 ([22], Lemma 4). Let Λ be a lattice in Rd. Then, for all z ∈ Rd, and κ > 0,
1− Λ(κ)
1 + Λ(κ)
≤ gκ,z(Λ)
gκ(Λ)
≤ 1.
For ease of notation, we will suppress the index d in (d), Λ(d)0 and Λ(d). We will find upper and lower
bounds for pU+V (u) and pU+V |x(u), and then use these to get an upper bound on the absolute value of the
difference between the two.
For a message X chosen at node A, let x be the coset representative of X from Λ∩V(Λ0). For any subset
S ⊆ Rd, let 1S(·) denote the indicator function of S, i.e., 1S(u) is 1 if u ∈ S, and 0 otherwise. From (34),
with κ =
√P, we have
pU |x(u) =
g√P(u)
g√P,−x(Λ0)
1Λ0+x(u). (65)
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Let GX := Λ ∩ V(Λ0), and M := |G(d)| = |GX |. Since the messages are uniformly distributed,
pU (u) =
∑
x∈GX
g√P(u)
g√P,−x(Λ0)
1(Λ0+x)(u)
M
. (66)
By monotonicity of the flatness factor, Λ0(
√P) < Λ0(
√P/2) = , and using Lemma 28,
g√P(u)
g√P(Λ0)
≤ g
√P(u)
g√P,−x(Λ0)
≤ g
√P(u)
g√P(Λ0)
1 + 
1−  .
Using this in (66), we get for u ∈ Λ,
g√P(u)
Mg√P(Λ0)
≤ pU (u) ≤
g√P(u)
Mg√P(Λ0)
1 + 
1−  . (67)
We will require bounds on g√P(Λ) in the proof. Rearranging the terms above,(
1− 
1 + 
)
pU (u)Mg√P(Λ0) ≤ g√P(u) ≤ pU (u)Mg√P(Λ0).
Since pU is a pmf supported over Λ, and
∑
u∈Λ pU (u) = 1, we can get(
1− 
1 + 
)
Mg√P(Λ0) ≤ g√P(Λ) ≤Mg√P(Λ0). (68)
It can be similarly verified that for any a ∈ Rn,(
1− 
1 + 
)
Mg√P
2 ,a
(Λ0) ≤ g√P
2 ,a
(Λ) ≤Mg√P
2 ,a
(Λ0). (69)
We establish some more notation for convenience. Let
α(w) :=
g√2P(w)
Mg√P(Λ0)
g√P
2
(Λ0)
g√P(Λ0)
, (70)
β(x,w) :=
(
g√P
2 ,
w
2 −x
(Λ0)
g√P
2
(Λ0)
)(
g√P,−x(Λ0)
g√P(Λ0)
)−1
. (71)
We can bound pU+V |x and pU+V as follows.
Lemma 29. For any lattice point w ∈ Λ, and any x ∈ GX , we have(
1− 
1 + 
)
α(w) ≤ pU+V (w) ≤
(
1 + 
1− 
)2
α(w) (72)
β(x,w)α(w) ≤ pU+V |x(w) ≤
(
1 + 
1− 
)
β(x,w)α(w). (73)
Proof: Let x be any fine lattice point from GX . Then,
pU+V |x(w) =
∑
t∈Λ0+x
pU |x(t)pV (w− t).
Using (65) and (67) in the above equation, we obtain∑
t∈Λ0+x
g√P(t)
g√P,−x(Λ0)
g√P(w− t)
Mg√P(Λ0)
≤ pU+V |x(w) ≤
∑
t∈Λ0+x
g√P(t)
g√P,−x(Λ0)
g√P(w− t)
Mg√P(Λ0)
(
1 + 
1− 
)
. (74)
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Consider the term
∑
t∈Λ0+x
g√P(t)
g√P,−x(Λ0)
g√P(w− t)
Mg√P(Λ0)
= 1
g√P,−x(Λ0)
1
Mg√P(Λ0)
∑
t∈Λ0+x
e
(
− ‖t‖22P − ‖t−w‖
2
2P
)
(2piP)d
= 1
Mg√P(Λ0)g√P,−x(Λ0)
∑
t∈Λ0+x
e
(
− ‖w‖24P −
‖t−w2 ‖
2
P
)
(2piP)d
=
g√2P(w)
Mg√P(Λ0)g√P,−x(Λ0)
∑
t∈Λ0+x
g√P
2 ,
w
2
(t)
=
g√2P(w)
Mg√P(Λ0)
g√P
2 ,
w
2 −x
(Λ0)
g√P,−x(Λ0)
. (75)
Substituting this in (74), and writing this in terms of α and β, we obtain (73). Similarly, bounding both pU
and pV from above and below using (67), proceeding as above, and finally using (69) to bound g√P
2 ,
w
2
(Λ),
we get (72).
Observe that β(x,w) in (71) is a ratio of two terms, both of which can be bounded using Lemma 28 to
get (
1− 
1 + 
)
≤ β(x,w) ≤
(
1 + 
1− 
)
. (76)
Let pU+V and pU+V respectively denote the upper and lower bounds for pU+V in (72), and let pU+V |x
and p
U+V |x respectively denote the upper and lower bounds for pU+V |x in (73). Then, we can say that
|pU+V |x(w)−pU+V (w)| is less than or equal to the maximum of |pU+V |x(w)−pU+V (w)| and |pU+V |x(w)−
pU+V (w)|.
Substituting for |pU+V |x(w)− pU+V (w)|, we get
|pU+V |x(w)− pU+V (w)| = α(w)
(
1− 
1 + 
) ∣∣∣∣∣
(
1 + 
1− 
)2
β(x,w)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ . (77)
However, from (76), we see that
1 <
(
1 + 
1− 
)
≤
(
1 + 
1− 
)2
β(x,w) ≤
(
1 + 
1− 
)3
,
and for  ≤ 1/2, we have
(
1+
1−
)3
≤ 1 + 64. Therefore,
|pU+V |x(w)− pU+V (w)| ≤ α(w)
(
1− 
1 + 
)
64. (78)
Similarly, expressing |p
U+V |x(w)−pU+V (w)| in terms of α and β, and using the fact that ((1− )/(1 + ))
3 ≥
1− 8 for  < 1/2, we get
|p
U+V |x(w)− pU+V (w)| ≤ α(w)
(
1 + 
1− 
)2
8. (79)
Rearranging (72), and observing that
∑
w∈Λ pU+V (w) = 1, we have(
1− 
1 + 
)2
≤
∑
w∈Λ
α(w) ≤
(
1 + 
1− 
)
. (80)
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Combining (78) and (79), and summing over w, we get
V(pU+V , pU+V |x) ≤
∑
w∈Λ
α(w) max
{(
1− 
1 + 
)
64,
(
1 + 
1− 
)2
8
}
,
and using (80) to bound
∑
w∈Λ α(w) from above, we get
V(pU+V , pU+V |x) ≤ max
{
64,
(
1 + 
1− 
)3
8
}
≤ max {64, 27× 8} ,
since  ≤ 1/2. Therefore,
V(pU+V , pU+V |x) ≤ 216,
thereby completing the proof.
Appendix G: Proof of Lemma 20
Recall that Z is the additive Gaussian noise vector in the MAC phase having mean zero and variance σ2,
and Z′ denotes the additive noise in the effective MLAN channel, and is equal to (α∗ − 1)(U + V) + α∗Z.
Let N denote a zero-mean Gaussian vector with covariance matrix ((1−α∗)22P+(α∗)2σ2)Id, and N′ denote
a zero-mean Gaussian vector with covariance matrix ((1− α∗)2P + (α∗)2σ2)Id. Let fN and fN′ denote the
densities of N and N′ respectively, and fU′|x denote the density of U′ := (α∗ − 1)U + N′ conditioned on
X = x. Let fV′|y denote the density function of V′ := (α∗ − 1)V + α∗Z conditioned on Y = y. Then, we
can write
V(fZ′|x,y, fN) ≤ V(fZ′|x,y, fU′|x) + V(fU′|x, fN).
But
V(fZ′|x,y, fU′|x) =
∫
w∈Rd
|fZ′|x,y(w)− fU′|x(w)| dw
=
∫
w∈Rd
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u∈Λ(d)0 +x
pU|x(u)
(
fV′|y(w− (α∗ − 1)u)− fN′(w− (α∗ − 1)u)
)∣∣∣∣ dw
≤
∑
u∈Λ(d)0 +x
pU|x(u)
(∫
w∈Rd
∣∣fV′|y(w− (α∗ − 1)u)− fN′(w− (α∗ − 1)u)∣∣ dw)
=
∑
u∈Λ(d)0 +x
pU|x(u)V(fV′|y, fN′)
= V(fV′|y, fN′).
Therefore,
V(fZ′|x,y, fN) ≤ V(fV′|y, fN′) + V(fU′|x, fN). (81)
Lemma 30 ([22], Lemma 8). Let Λ be a lattice in Rd, x ∈ Rd, and σ1, σ2 > 0. Let U be a random vector
supported on Λ + x, having pmf gσ1(u)/gσ1,x(Λ). If Z is an iid Gaussian random vector with mean zero and
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variance σ22, and Λ
(
σ1σ2√
σ21+σ22
)
< 1/2, then the density of U + Z, fU+Z, satisfies
V(fU+Z, g√σ21+σ22 ) ≤ 4 Λ
(
σ1σ2√
σ21 + σ22
)
.
Using Lemma 30 and the fact that for any constant a > 0, 
aΛ(d)0
(aθ) = Λ(d)0 (θ) [22, Remark 4], we get
V(fV′|y, fN′) ≤ 4Λ(d)0
(
α∗
√
Pσ2√
(1− α∗)2P + (α∗)2σ2
)
(82)
≤ 4Λ(d)0
(
α∗
√
Pσ2√
(1− α∗)22P + (α∗)2σ2
)
(83)
= 4Λ(d)0
(√
α∗P
)
, (84)
where (83) is by the monotonicity of the flatness factor. Equation (84) is then obtained by substituting
α∗ = 2P/(2P + σ2) and simplifying. By similar arguments, we can show that
V(fU′|x, fN) ≤ 4Λ(d)0
(√
α∗P
)
.
Substituting in (81) completes the proof.
Appendix H: Proof of Lemma 23
We want to show that I(X1, . . . , XN ; Θk,N ) is arbitrarily small for all sufficiently large d. Using the chain
rule of mutual information, and making some observations about the conditional independence of these
random variables, we will show that this quantity can be written as a sum of mutual information terms
between the ith message, Xi, and the vector Wk[2i + k − 1], conditioned on everything observed by the
kth relay in the first 2i + k − 2 phases. We will then bound each of these mutual information terms from
above by a quantity of the form I(X; E(X) + E(Y )), so that we can invoke the results of Section VII to
conclude that each of these terms go to zero as d→∞. We would like to remark that the techniques used
in this proof hold good for any coding scheme that achieves strong secrecy over the bidirectional relay, and
in particular, the one in [19].
Making repeated use of the chain rule of mutual information, we see that
I(X1, . . . , XN ; Θk,N ) =
N∑
t=1
I(Xt; Θk,N
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1)
=
N∑
t=1
[
I(Xt; Jk, Jk−1
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1) + N∑
n=1
I(Xt; Wk[2n+ k − 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,n−1)]
=
N∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
I(Xt; Wk[2n+ k − 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,n−1), (85)
where the last step follows from the fact that I(Xt; Jk, Jk−1
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1) = 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ N , since the
messages and the jamming signals are independent.
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We will first show that many terms in the above summation are zero. We will make use of the fact that if
X,Y, and Z are random variables distributed over a finite group G, with X being uniformly distributed over
G and independent of (Y, Z), then X ⊕ Y is uniformly distributed over G and independent of Z. Observe
that for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, Θk,n−1 consists of random variables which are all functions of X1, . . . , Xn−1 and
Jk−1, . . . , Jk+n−1, which are all independent of Xt for n ≤ t (even when conditioned on the first l − 1 < t
messages). Therefore,
Proposition 31. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ N , and n, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}. Then, the message Xt is conditionally independent
of Θk,n−1 given X1, X2, . . . , Xl−1.
Using a similar argument, we obtain
Proposition 32. Let 1 ≤ t < n ≤ N .The vector Wk[2n+k−1] received by the kth relay in the (2n+k−1)st
phase is independent of X1, . . . , Xt and Θk,n−1.
We now evaluate the terms in (85). Using Proposition 31, we get
I(Xt; Wk[2n+ k − 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,n−1) = 0 (86)
for all 1 ≤ n < t ≤ N . Similarly, using Proposition 32,
I(Xt; Wk[2n+ k − 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,n−1) = 0 (87)
for all 1 ≤ t < n ≤ N . Therefore, (85) reduces to
I(X1, . . . , XN ; Θk,N ) =
N∑
t=1
I(Xt; Wk[2t+ k − 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,t−1). (88)
The mutual information I(Xt; Wk[2t+k−1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,t−1) can be written in terms of conditional
entropies as
I(Xt; Wk[2t+ k − 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,t−1) = H(Wk[2t+ k + 1]∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,t−1)
−H(Wk[2t+ k + 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt,Θk,t−1). (89)
Let us evaluate each of the terms on the right hand side. Consider the second term,
H(Wk[2t+ k + 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt,Θk,t−1) ≥ H(Wk[2t+ k + 1]∣∣X1, . . . , Xt,⊕tp=1Xp ⊕ Jk+t−1,Θk,t−1)
= H(Wk[2t+ k + 1]
∣∣⊕tp=1 Xp ⊕ Jk+t−1). (90)
The first step is true because conditioning reduces entropy. The second step requires more justification. Given
⊕tp=1Xp⊕Jk+t−1, the term Vk−1[2t+k−1] is independent of X1, . . . , Xt,Θk,t−1. The jamming signal, Jk+t
is independent of Θk,t−1, all the first t messages, and ⊕tp=1Xp ⊕ Jk+t−1. Therefore, Vk+1[2t + k − 1], and
hence, Wk[2t+k−1] is also independent of Θk,t−1, the first t messages and ⊕tp=1Xp⊕Jk+t−1, thus justifying
(90). Now, define X := ⊕tp=1Xp ⊕ Jk+t−1, and Y := ⊕t−1p=1Xp ⊕ Jk+t. Then, we have,
H(Wk[2t+ k + 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt,Θk,t−1) ≥ H(E(X) + E(Y )∣∣X).
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From Proposition 32, the first term of (89), H(Wk[2t + k + 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,t−1) = H (E(X) + E(Y )).
Therefore, I(Xt; Wk[2t + k − 1]
∣∣X1, . . . , Xt−1,Θk,t−1) is bounded above by I(X; E(X) + E(Y )), and the
random variables X and Y are independent and uniformly distributed over G(d). The lemma now follows
by using Theorem 18 and Lemma 17 to bound this quantity.
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